Predicating Nothingness vs Not Predicating Being
June 8th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Unacknowleged Consequences :: The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: The misnamed Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: Unacknowleged Consequences
Predicating Nothingness vs Not Predicating Being
michaelP wrote:
>jPolanik wrote:
>>do you claim the power to attribute predicates to nothing(ness) or do
>>you not?
>For me, predicating be-ing is ‘impossible’ in the sense of being
>pointless; such an act could only begin to be worthwhile if such an
>attempt at the (analytically) impossible led to an understanding and
>analysis of its impossibility and thus led on to a discussion as to the
>be-ing of predicating itself.
it is one thing to claim the power to attribute predicates to
nothing(ness); and, it is another thing to note the circumstances in
which one appears unable to attribute predicates to that which is.
in the post to which you are responding, I spoke only about the former.
in a post from some time ago (2008-04-16):
“in Heidegger’s analysis of ‘be-ing’, he concludes that predicating
‘be-ing’ turns ‘be-ing’ into a being; and, he suggests that this is a
bad thing. if that is the case; then, then Heidegger has found the point
at which he should start to observe Wittgenstein’s advice: whereof one
can not speak thereof one must remain silent. but, instead of following
that advice, Heidegger just kept on cranking out statements predicating
be-ing.”
in any event, if I ask you about your stand on predicating nothing(ness)
and your reply claims that it is ‘impossible’ to predicate be-ing’;
then, I have to wonder whether these two concepts are related in your
view. are they?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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