Qualia as Transcendelia
October 26th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Accepting the Evidence of Experience :: Referencing Qualia, Is That Transcendentalism? :: The Property, The Brainstate and the Qualia :: Qualia as Dissimulatia
Okay; so, Qualia are Transcendelia
[Jud (previously)]: I never *eliminate* any words, as I am tired of
telling you. I simply point out that such words do not have any
denotatum. That means that what needs to be addressed by me in such
circumstances … is the existential modality of the brain of the person
who used such an unreferenced abstract noun.
[Joe (new)]: as an aside, the defining feature of eliminativism that
distinguishes it from other versions of physicalism is the belief that
the progress of science will eliminate use of terms such as belief,
desire and other terms of ‘folk psychology’ the way advances in
chemistry eliminated the use of ‘phlogiston’.
[Joe (previously)]: I understand you to mean what you say in the next
paragraph: that you personally do not use words that refer to qualia;
and, consequently, whenever you use the word ‘afterimage’ you are
referring to a brain state.
[Jud]: You have avoided the question again.
[Joe (new)]: what part of my previous statement reflects a
misunderstanding? do you actually use words that refer to qualia? have
you, in fact, stopped using ‘afterimage’; or, do you, in fact, use
‘afterimage’ to refer to something other than a brain state or other
physical fact or existential modality?Okay; so, Qualia are Transcendelia
[Jud]: You have still not confirmed that you have grasped what I MEAN
when I say I never *eliminate* any words, I simply point out that such
words do not have any denotatum.
[Joe (new)]: claiming that ‘afterimage’ has no referent is both false
and irrelevant.
1. that the claim is false. in my vocabulary ‘afterimage’ refers to the
patch of color people see under circumstances that are specifiable with
sufficient precision for the phenomenon to be reproduced in the
laboratory. in your vocabulary ‘afterimage’ refers to the brain state
associated with this phenomenological reality.
2. that the claim is irrelevant.
2.1: are you saying that no word which has no referent should be used?
if so, you will need to state a case for this injunction before; and, in
my opinion, said case should explain why no one can follow the example
of mathematicians who *define* the phrase ‘empty set’ to refer to a set
that contains no members. based on this example, it seems reasonable to
conclude that at least some words that have no referents may be used;
and, I’ve previously given you an example of a word that is usefully
used precisely because it is defined to have no referent: whatever word
whose morphology indicates that it means not-[root predicate] relative
to the linguistic frame of reference of the speaker.
in your case, since that which is is an existent, ‘non-existent’ would,
by definition, have no referent. any, yet, one may usefully say, any
existent stands out from non-existence. I understand that you have
chosen not to make such statements. you’ve never made a case for the
proposition that no one should say this; so, I fail to see why anyone
would have any motivation to imitate your example.
2.2: are you trying to say that qualia don’t exist as physical objects.
if so, the claim is irrelevant because no one contests it. the relevant
question would be, ‘do qualia exist in some other sense?’.
[Jud]: That means that the only thing left to be addressed by me (if I
choose to reply) in such circumstances - is the way the *mis-referencer*
exists, i. e., the human who believes that something that does not exist
- exists
it would be quite reasonable to ask why most people agree with you that
afterimages do not exist as physical objects but believe that they exist
in some other sense of the word ‘exist’. however, you will get nowhere
if you investigate the matter with preconceived notions such as:
[Jud]: in order to find out why, and upon the basis of what hard
evidence he believes that the invisible pseudo entity is real.
[Joe]: you might try stating a case for the proposition that existent
can not ever be used in any sense other than ‘existing as matergy’. in
my opinion, to do this you will have to explain why, in the case of the
claim regarding an even prime number, no mathematician on the planent is
allowed to translate the existential quantifier to say ‘there exists an
even prime number’.
[Joe]: until you do that, it is clear that ‘existent’ can be
*legitimately* used in a sense that doesn’t refer to an existent
existing as matergy. it is in that sense in which it is also legitmate
to say ‘afterimages exist’.
[Jud]: With regard to the word *afterimage* I do not refer to the
*qualia,* for I reject the whole Lewisean idea of *qualia* along with
other qualophiles and similar Nagelian, chiropteran infantile nonsense.
It is a holistically-felt painful toe that exists - NOT *toe-pain.*
[Joe]: suppose I claim that when I use the word ‘afterimage’ I am
referring to the qualia not the brain state; is that enough to be
considered a transcendalist as you define that term?
[Jud]: Ontologically speaking - (in ontological discussion) if you use
the word ‘afterimage’ when referring to the qualia, brain state,
properties or existential modalities WITHOUT CONFIRMING THAT YOU ARE
EMPLOYING THEM MERELY AS USEFUL FICTIONS then that is enough to be
considered a transcendalist -
[Joe]: okay; I’m clearly a transcendentalist in that sense.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@