Questioning the Nazi - Ontology of power
October 28th, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: Squirm-Time Again for Jewish Apologists. :: What is an Ontology? :: Somewhat Vexing– Ontology qua Thanatos :: Questioning the Nazi Heidegger’s Ontology of Power
Cologne 28-Oct-2006
Kevin Winters schrieb Fri, 27 Oct 2006 09:12:52 -0700:
> I found the following in _What is Called Thinking?_, the first lecture
> Heidegger gave following his involvement with Nazism. The context is his
> talking about Nietzsche’s Ubermensch.
>
> “Nietzsche’s thinking gives expression to something that already exists but
> is still concealed from current views. We may assume, then, that here and
> there, still invisible to the public eye, the superman already exists. But
> we must never look for the superman’s figure and nature in those characters
> who by a shallow and misconceived will to power are pushed to the top as the
> chief functionaries of the various organizations in which that will to power
> incorporates itself” (59-60).
>
> Not long after that Heidegger quotes Nietzsche’s claim that the rise of the
> “German Reich” is the “form of decline of the state” (in “Twilight of the
> Idols,” _Portable Nietzsche_, 543. Pertinent, I think.
ME: What is questionable here is that Heidegger’s thinking on power and the state emerges from his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, and never results in a concept (i.e. ontological concept or _idea_ in the original sense of the term) of power, will to power or state. “Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht.” Indeed.
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>
>
> Kevin Winters
>
> Furthermore, to say that Christianity is empty of content because it is not
> a doctrine is only chicanery. When a believer exists in faith, his existence
> has enormous content, but not in the sense of a yield in paragraphs.
> Johannes Climacus/Soren Kierkegaard
>
> >From: “michaelP”
> >Reply-To: Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
> >
> >To: Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
> >
> >Subject: Re: Questioning the Nazi
> >Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2006 16:52:47 +0100
> >
> >Besinnung? I haven’t read any of that text before today; it seems similar
> >in
> >tone to Contributions. The questioning seems so fecund, so fundamental, and
> >so radical in its answering sway to the pop-vulgarity of Hitler’s
> >”attitudinal” quote. Such questioning would be put to immediate death by
> >any
> >nazi I can think of (if they could even sniff the meat of it).
> >
> >Thanks, Pete.
> >
> >regards
> >
> >michaelP
> >
> > > Mindfulness
> > >
> > > — michaelP wrote:
> > >
> > >> Pete, wherefrom the Heidegger (?) quotes? Contributions?
> > >>
> > >> regards
> > >>
> > >> michaelP
> > >>
> > >> > “There is no attitude, which could not be ultimately justified by the
> > >> ensuing
> > >> > usefulness for the totality” (Adolf Hitler 30, January 1939)
> > >> >
> > >> > Who makes up this totality? (Eighty million-strong extant human mass?
> >Does
> > >> its
> > >> > extantness assign to this human mass the right to the claim on a
> >continued
> > >> > existence?)
> > >> >
> > >> > How is this totality determined? What is its goal? Is it itself the
> >goal of
> > >> all
> > >> > goals? Why? Wherein lies the justification for this goal-setting?
> > >> >
> > >> > When is the usefulness of an attitude ascertained? Wherein lies the
> > >> criterion
> > >> > for usefulness? Who determines the usefulness? By what means does
> >this
> > >> > determination justify itself in each case? Can and should the one who
> > >> adopts
> > >> an
> > >> > “attitude” also judge its usefulness and its harm at the same time?
> > >> >
> > >> > Why is usefulness the criterion for the legitimacy of a human
> > >> attitude?
> > >> > On what is this principle grounded? Who determies the ownmost of the
> >domain
> > >> of
> > >> > man?
> > >> >
> > >> >>From where does the appeal to usefulness as the measure of truth
> >acquire
> > >> its
> > >> > comprehensibility? Does comprehensibility justify legitimacy?
> > >> >
> > >> > What is “totality”, if not the quantitative expansion of a particular
> > >> > conception of man as an individual?
> > >> >
> > >> > What does attitude mean? Does one arrive at what is
> >fundamental to
> > >> human
> > >> > being through an attitude? If not, then what does justification of an
> > >> attitude
> > >> > by the totality and by the ensuing usefulness for the totality mean?
> > >> >
> > >> > Is there not in this concept “attitude” already a renunciation of
> >every
> > >> > fundamental questionability of a human being with respect to its
> >hidden
> > >> > relation to beyng?
> > >> >
> > >> > Is not man beforehand and ultimately tied here to the pursuit and
> >control
> > >> of
> > >> > beings in the abandonment by being? and what are “ideas”? Do they not
> >count
> > >> as
> > >> > names for the final ‘dis-humanization’ of everything that man still
> >and
> > >> always
> > >> > creates beyond himself, so that through “ideas” he inevitably falls
> >below
> > >> his
> > >> > ownmost? Are not “ideas” phantoms that serve solely the “eternal”
> > >> forth-rolling
> > >> > and up-surging of “life” and fully close off man in his animality as
> >a
> > >> > “living-being”?
> > >> >
> > >> > Is not all “attitude” together with totality of a “people” shoved
> >down the
> > >> > yawning abyss of “beings” insofar as attitude and totality always
> >merely
> > >> spin
> > >> > around themselves?
> > >> >
> > >> > And does not such a ‘casting-oneself-away’ to being entail the
> >ultimate
> > >> > renunciation of every inceptual, fundamental calling of man for
> >struggling
> > >> –
> > >> > with a knowing leap unto beyng — for the essence of
> >gods and
> > >> for
> > >> > ‘the time-space’ of their essencing?
> > >> >
> > >> > 66 V 47 (1939)
