Recovering the First Person Perspective in Heideggerian Philosophy
September 28th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Recovering the First Person Perspective in Heideggerian Philosophy :: Recovering the First Person Perspective in Heideggerian Philosophy :: Recovering the First Person Perspective in Heideggerian Philosophy :: Recovering the First Person Perspective in Heideggerian Philosophy
Bernx at aol.com wrote:
>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:
>>what is your response to my claim that the first person perspective
>>exhibits an area of common ground shared by Descartes and Heidegger?
>That claim would apply to every philosopher since Thales and
>Anaximander. Nietzsche had it right when he noted that all philosophy
>understood in its subtext represents the confession of the philosopher.
>There is no such thing as “confession” without the first person
>perspective.
a very much underappreciated point.
this insight then begs the question: what does the reader do
with a text written in the third person concerning a topic that must
have a first-person, self-referencing perspective?
can Heideggerian philosophy (or any other) affect the reader who does
not, at some point, say ‘this applies to me’ or ‘I know see that my life
has been inauthentic’ or ‘I wonder if I have lived authentically’ … ?
it the author may be said to have ‘exported’ a first-person perspective
into third person language; it would seem to follow that the reader
would have to import the text by translating key phrases into the first
person and making that important self-reference.
this raises the question of what are those key phrases? where does
Heidegger hide the import key in the text of, say BaT?
I’ve been reading Crowell’s “Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in
_Being and Time_” (Inquiry. 44:433-54. 2001).
according to Crowell, the inauthentic dasein is immersed in the
they-self wherein its ’self’ is reflected back to it from the others
around it. this breaks down in the call of conscience which ‘comes from
that entity which in each case I myself am’ [BaT 323].
in this breakdown of the ‘they-self’, what is lost? the identification
with a social role. I am a plumber. I am a father. I am a Star Trek fan.
etc. these are the types of identifications that are non-informative
even (or especially) when true. they do not inform the I-2 making the
identification as to its own nature — it does not help answer the
question ‘what am I’ or its third-person analogue ‘what is a human’.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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