Heidegger

Schizo-Epistemology: Self-Identity for All Reality Types?

The Crifasi Argument:

>1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
>that I exist.

>2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
>all my perceptions.

>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

>5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.

>Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.

you claim that you have a ‘FURTHER’ argument for the proposition ‘I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’. according to you
this proposition (your original premise 1) is true because “Denying that
would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
born, I am now X, I will die).”

you’ve never addressed my challenge to your assumption that your first
person statements support your conclusion irregardless of the reality
type of the referent of ‘I’. I summarize that argument here.

[Context]:

there was some discussion of how you knew that the argument based on
your set of first person statements (I was born, I am now X, I will die)
applied to the various reality types that ‘I’ might refer to; and, on
2008-03-29, you replied that your argument applied to “any of them”.

I then presented two counterarguments. your reply to the first was
inadequate and evasive; and, you ignored the second altogether. let us
review these

1. The Self-Refuting Conclusion

[JP, 2008-03-29]:

okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
logical deduction that I am not nothing’.

now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.

how about it, Professor? is Heidegger’s ‘Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have
not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

2. Testing Claims Against Specific Reality Types

[JP, 2008-04-02]:

you are claiming that your argument remains true when applied to an I of
any reality type. in a sense, you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a
variable which ranges over a certain set of proposed reality types. you
say the argument “covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1
and I-3 are not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal”.

so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
chosen reality type.

ok. I choose the I-3.

to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.

[NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]

go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
you may have for the proposition that “I-3 remain self-identical
throughout all my perceptions”

at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
am not nothing’.

[JP (new material)]:

Anthony, you’ve never addressed the question raised by your claim that
your argument applied to all reality types:

in the case of the I-3, how do you know either:

1. that there is no I-3; or,

2. that there is an I-3 and that it is self-identical throughout all its
perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so
on?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, May 11th, 2008 at 6:03 am
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