Heidegger

>From now on, Joseph, please give links (as do I) to the archived posts that
you quote, so that anyone may see how I replied to them.

On 5/5/08, Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Schizo-Epistemology: Self-Identity for All Reality Types?
>
> The Crifasi Argument:
>
> >1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
> >that I exist.
>
> >2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
> >remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
> >all my perceptions.
>
> >4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
> >5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.
>
> >Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.
>
> you claim that you have a ‘FURTHER’ argument for the proposition ‘I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’. according to you
> this proposition (your original premise 1) is true because “Denying that
> would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
> pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
> born, I am now X, I will die).”
>
> you’ve never addressed my challenge to your assumption that your first
> person statements support your conclusion irregardless of the reality
> type of the referent of ‘I’. I summarize that argument here.
>
> [Context]:
>
> there was some discussion of how you knew that the argument based on
> your set of first person statements (I was born, I am now X, I will die)
> applied to the various reality types that ‘I’ might refer to; and, on
> 2008-03-29, you replied that your argument applied to “any of them”.
>
> I then presented two counterarguments. your reply to the first was
> inadequate and evasive; and, you ignored the second altogether. let us
> review these
>
> 1. The Self-Refuting Conclusion
>
> [JP, 2008-03-29]:
>
> okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
> have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
> the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
> logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
>
> now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
> Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
> how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
> proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>
> if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
> conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
> asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
> is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>
> how about it, Professor? is Heidegger’s ‘Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have
> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

This was my answer to the above post:
 http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/j…

Please address every item in my reply without clipping anything out. And
please link your quotes from now on. A simple google search for a
distinctive phrase in the text will give you the link.

2. Testing Claims Against Specific Reality Types
>
> [JP, 2008-04-02]:
>
> you are claiming that your argument remains true when applied to an I of
> any reality type. in a sense, you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a
> variable which ranges over a certain set of proposed reality types. you
> say the argument “covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1
> and I-3 are not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal”.
>
> so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
> merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
> chosen reality type.
>
> ok. I choose the I-3.
>
> to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
> prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
> that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
> is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
>
> [NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
> I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
> or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
>
> go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
> you may have for the proposition that “I-3 remain self-identical
> throughout all my perceptions”
>
> at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
> that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
> conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
> am not nothing’.
>
> [JP (new material)]:
>
> Anthony, you’ve never addressed the question raised by your claim that
> your argument applied to all reality types:

in the case of the I-3, how do you know either:
>
> 1. that there is no I-3; or,
>
> 2. that there is an I-3 and that it is self-identical throughout all its
> perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so
> on?

My response to the above, as well as your latter question, is here:
 http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…

We are now in the midst of arguing about my reply, regarding the identity of
the first person pronoun and its relationship to the identity of the
referent. Please link your quotes from now on (as do I) so that you do not
miss my replies and mischaracterize me as not replying again.

Posted on Sunday, May 11th, 2008 at 6:04 am
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