Heidegger

Cologne 30-Apr-2008

allen scult schrieb Tue, 29 Apr 2008 12:25:41 +0900:

> >
> >
> >allen scult schrieb Sat, 26 Apr 2008 12:20:34 +0900:
> >
> >> >Joe to Ant:
> >> >
> >> >> you seem to be puzzled by the way language users use the same word time
> >> >> and again even though the referent changes (however slightly) over time.
> >> >>
> >> >> take the word ‘chair’. I use this word to denote my chair day after day
> >> >> even though the changes constantly. The fabric is getting worn, the
> >> >> frame creaks more and more, there’s a coffee stain on it that wasn’t
> >> >> there before, yada, yada, yada. but I still call it a chair.
> >> >
> >> >MP: Joe, this is another interruption in your battle with Anthony and so can
> be
> >> >disregarded if the flow gets too distracted by my brief musing. It seems to
> >> >me that what words (say, chair, tree, I, etc {yes, even etc}) designate and
> >> >identify is not the ever-changing material-energetic consistency of their,
> >> >er, material-energetic constituents (to the extent to which the designated
> >> >*are* {are identical to, are rendered as, are cast as} such
> >> >materiality-energicity), but that which in each case and in its
> >>own way *is*
> >> >*what* is ever-changing in its material-energetic consistency etc. Whether
> >> >the tree (just outside my backdoor viewable now from my window as I type
> >> >these words) that I designate as such with the word “tree” is in full leafy
> >> >bloom (in summer) or starkly bereft of leafiness (in winter) or
> >>slowly dying
> >> >as it just about stands or uprooted and replanted in Joni Mitchell’s
> >> >horrendous tree museum is what is the same (and different to the other(s)
> >> >and to nothingness) in each and every case, even every possible
> >>(but not yet
> >> >or necessarily concrete) case. Identity here does not mean the same in the
> >> >sense of exact identical quantum stste of the ever-changing
> >> >material-energetic consistency/configuration (for example) of the
> >>tree. What
> >> >we see as a tree is ’seeing’ a *what*, not an ever-changing retinally-given
> >> >image or flickering of colour perceptions. The “referent” you
> >>refer to above
> >> >is not that what(ness) that the word designates (in my sense) but a series
> >> >of adjudged perceptions (that add up to the ever-changing, etc). Ah, but
> >> >when it comes to human-being, the being that is human, da-sein (not the
> >> >body-mind-thing), the word “da-sein” neither refers to the
> >>ever-changing nor
> >> >to the never-changing, rather to difference its self (and the explicit
> >> >advent of nothingness, but that’s another story).
> >> >
> >> >yada yada yadasein
> >> >
> >> >regards
> >> >
> >> >michaelP
> >>
> >> Hi Michael,
> >>
> >> I find the idea of Dasein as difference appealing, elegant. It
> >> points to a core element in Dasein’s way of being., a sui-generous,
> >> very generous being as becoming. This is a true wonder. Dasein
> >> different-iates itself as does every other Dasaein. And each Dasein
> >> does it in its own-most distinctive way. Where do all these
> >> similarly distinctive Daseins get their ownmost distinctions from,
> >> each with its way of being dasein as one’s own? >From DIFFERENCE of
> >> course, the very difference of difference, Dasein as difference, its
> >> very own difference.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >>
> >> Allen
> >> ’s
> >>
> >
> >ME: This discussion of self-identity overlooks that all identity is
> >an identity
> >of identity and difference. This is apparent in even the simplest of
> >observations
> >and statements, such as, “This is an e-mail.” This-here is identified as an
> >e-mail, even though this is obviously not an e-mail. To IDENTIFY
> >this-here AS an
> >e-mail means seeing and positing a DIFFERENCE. This carries over to the
> >phenomenon of human being (Dasein) and its selfhood. A self is only
> >possible as
> >an identification with what an individual human being is not. A
> >trivial example
> >makes this apparent: If you are asked to identify yourself (e.g. at
> >customs, in
> >the bank, to the police, etc.) you do not simply point a finger at yourself or
> >say tautologically, “I am I”, but you show your photo ID or passport, i.e. you
> >show what you are clearly NOT, something that is obviously different from you.
> >But showing this difference is precisely what conclusively proves
> >your identity.
> >
> >Hence, the simple observation and statement, “This is an e-mail”, already
> >contains the mystery of philosophy (of being), something which analytic
> >philosophy per se (and all thinking based on ‘logic’) can only
> >understand through
> >self-destruction.
> >It is entirely superficial to locate Dasein’s difference in its becoming, or,
> >conversely, to want to locate identity in a self-same constancy over time.
> >Something can only become (in a movement of one kind or another)
> >what it is not
> >because it always already is _its_ other.
>
> AS: I think this might be a good time to bring in Dasein as
> being-with{-others}, about whom Heidegger says, ” By Others we
> mean. . .those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish
> oneself–those among whom one IS too. If these Others are
> co-terminous(that is for the sake of the concept)with the “other” you
> speak of, that is the other that Dasein already is( the other of the
> not), it seems we have here an apparent contradiction between ways of
> understanding.
>
> If I may speak plainly, I have always been uncertain of this business
> of oneself as other, one’s other as oneself etc. My experience with
> myself and others is more along the lines suggested by Heidegger. I
> know myself to be who I am by virtue of of my standing with others
> among whom I am too.
>
> I don’t know from whence cometh difference, if indeed it cometh at
> all. I’m talking here of difference only as it obtains in the matter
> of self-identity. its part in most everything else that is, is
> clear..
>
> I have more to say here, but I’m not sure in which direction to go.
> I’m open to suggestions and in any case, I’ll be back.
>
> Regards,
> Allen
>

ME: “Whence cometh difference”? By referring to the “Others” have you not already
invoked difference? I myself am different from the others, even if I am the same as
them. That is the belonging-together that identity is, i.e. a belonging-together of
differentes.

What does “my standing with others among whom I am too” mean? Presumably it does not
mean a physical standing among others. What kind of “standing” and what kind of
“standing among”, then enables you to know who you are? Is this “standing” a social
standing? Do you have a standing per se, i.e. through yourself, or is it the others
that give you a “standing”, to whom you then belong and are “among”?

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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred (c)_-_-
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Posted on Sunday, May 4th, 2008 at 6:01 am
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