Heidegger

>Cologne 30-Apr-2008
>
>allen scult schrieb Tue, 29 Apr 2008 12:25:41 +0900:
>
>> >
>> >
>> >allen scult schrieb Sat, 26 Apr 2008 12:20:34 +0900:
>> >
>> >> >Joe to Ant:
>> >> >
>> >> >> you seem to be puzzled by the way language users use the
>>same word time
>> >> >> and again even though the referent changes (however
>>slightly) over time.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> take the word ‘chair’. I use this word to denote my chair
>>day after day
>> >> >> even though the changes constantly. The fabric is getting worn, the
>> >> >> frame creaks more and more, there’s a coffee stain on it that wasn’t
>> >> >> there before, yada, yada, yada. but I still call it a chair.
>> >> >
>> >> >MP: Joe, this is another interruption in your battle with
>>Anthony and so can
>> be
>> >> >disregarded if the flow gets too distracted by my brief
>>musing. It seems to
>> >> >me that what words (say, chair, tree, I, etc {yes, even etc})
>>designate and
>> >> >identify is not the ever-changing material-energetic
>>consistency of their,
>> >> >er, material-energetic constituents (to the extent to which
>>the designated
>> >> >*are* {are identical to, are rendered as, are cast as} such
>> >> >materiality-energicity), but that which in each case and in its
>> >>own way *is*
>> >> >*what* is ever-changing in its material-energetic consistency
>>etc. Whether
>> >> >the tree (just outside my backdoor viewable now from my
>>window as I type
>> >> >these words) that I designate as such with the word “tree” is
>>in full leafy
>> >> >bloom (in summer) or starkly bereft of leafiness (in winter) or
>> >>slowly dying
>> >> >as it just about stands or uprooted and replanted in Joni Mitchell’s
>> >> >horrendous tree museum is what is the same (and different to
>>the other(s)
>> >> >and to nothingness) in each and every case, even every possible
>> >>(but not yet
>> >> >or necessarily concrete) case. Identity here does not mean
>>the same in the
>> >> >sense of exact identical quantum stste of the ever-changing
>> >> >material-energetic consistency/configuration (for example) of the
>> >>tree. What
>> >> >we see as a tree is ’seeing’ a *what*, not an ever-changing
>>retinally-given
>> >> >image or flickering of colour perceptions. The “referent” you
>> >>refer to above
>> >> >is not that what(ness) that the word designates (in my sense)
>>but a series
>> >> >of adjudged perceptions (that add up to the ever-changing,
>>etc). Ah, but
>> >> >when it comes to human-being, the being that is human, da-sein (not the
>> >> >body-mind-thing), the word “da-sein” neither refers to the
>> >>ever-changing nor
>> >> >to the never-changing, rather to difference its self (and the explicit
>> >> >advent of nothingness, but that’s another story).
>> >> >
>> >> >yada yada yadasein
>> >> >
>> >> >regards
>> >> >
>> >> >michaelP
>> >>
>> >> Hi Michael,
>> >>
>> >> I find the idea of Dasein as difference appealing, elegant. It
>> >> points to a core element in Dasein’s way of being., a sui-generous,
> > >> very generous being as becoming. This is a true wonder. Dasein
>> >> different-iates itself as does every other Dasaein. And each Dasein
>> >> does it in its own-most distinctive way. Where do all these
>> >> similarly distinctive Daseins get their ownmost distinctions from,
>> >> each with its way of being dasein as one’s own? >From DIFFERENCE of
>> >> course, the very difference of difference, Dasein as difference, its
>> >> very own difference.
>> >>
>> >> Best regards,
>> >>
>> >> Allen
>> >> ’s
>> >>
>> >
>> >ME: This discussion of self-identity overlooks that all identity is
>> >an identity
>> >of identity and difference. This is apparent in even the simplest of
>> >observations
>> >and statements, such as, “This is an e-mail.” This-here is identified as an
>> >e-mail, even though this is obviously not an e-mail. To IDENTIFY
>> >this-here AS an
>> >e-mail means seeing and positing a DIFFERENCE. This carries over to the
>> >phenomenon of human being (Dasein) and its selfhood. A self is only
> > >possible as
>> >an identification with what an individual human being is not. A
>> >trivial example
>> >makes this apparent: If you are asked to identify yourself (e.g. at
>> >customs, in
>> >the bank, to the police, etc.) you do not simply point a finger
>>at yourself or
>> >say tautologically, “I am I”, but you show your photo ID or
>>passport, i.e. you
>> >show what you are clearly NOT, something that is obviously
>>different from you.
>> >But showing this difference is precisely what conclusively proves
>> >your identity.
>> >
>> >Hence, the simple observation and statement, “This is an e-mail”, already
>> >contains the mystery of philosophy (of being), something which analytic
>> >philosophy per se (and all thinking based on ‘logic’) can only
>> >understand through
>> >self-destruction.
>> >It is entirely superficial to locate Dasein’s difference in its
>>becoming, or,
>> >conversely, to want to locate identity in a self-same constancy over time.
>> >Something can only become (in a movement of one kind or another)
>> >what it is not
>> >because it always already is _its_ other.
>>
>> AS: I think this might be a good time to bring in Dasein as
>> being-with{-others}, about whom Heidegger says, ” By Others we
>> mean. . .those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish
>> oneself–those among whom one IS too. If these Others are
>> co-terminous(that is for the sake of the concept)with the “other” you
>> speak of, that is the other that Dasein already is( the other of the
>> not), it seems we have here an apparent contradiction between ways of
>> understanding.
>>
>> If I may speak plainly, I have always been uncertain of this business
>> of oneself as other, one’s other as oneself etc. My experience with
>> myself and others is more along the lines suggested by Heidegger. I
>> know myself to be who I am by virtue of of my standing with others
>> among whom I am too.
>>
>> I don’t know from whence cometh difference, if indeed it cometh at
>> all. I’m talking here of difference only as it obtains in the matter
>> of self-identity. its part in most everything else that is, is
>> clear..
>>
>> I have more to say here, but I’m not sure in which direction to go.
>> I’m open to suggestions and in any case, I’ll be back.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Allen
>>
>
>ME: “Whence cometh difference”? By referring to the “Others” have
>you not already
>invoked difference? I myself am different from the others, even if I
>am the same as
>them. That is the belonging-together that identity is, i.e. a
>belonging-together of
>differentes.

A.S.Not as I understand “Others” in the passage that is key to my
thinking here:

“Die Anderen” basagt nicht soviel wie: der ganze Rest der Uebrigen
ausser mir, aus dem sich das Ich heraushebt, die Anderen sind
vielmehr die, von denen man selbst sich zumeist NICHT unterscheidet
unter denen man auch ist (117)

(By “others” we do not mean everyone else but me–those over against
whom the “I” stands out. They are those from whom, for the most part
one doe NOT distinguish oneself–those among whom one is too.

The “I” identifies itself as being-with those with whom one one
“belongs together,” by virtue of the principle dimension of one’s
identity–how one identifies oneself. This identification, this
belonging-together is enacted through the manner of one’s concernful
dealings, one’s rhetorical style, if you will. This rhetorical
enactment of one’s identity is not amenable to circumspection,
because what might have served as a reflective mirror (and there is
nothing better than one’s rhetorical enactments) is already absorbed
into the outward movement of its usefulness, its adaptation to those
among whom one stands. These are the others with whom one speaks,
even if they are not. (There might be some overstatement here, but
again, let’s let it stand, for the moment, for the sake of the
concept.)

>M.E,
>What does “my standing with others among whom I am too” mean?
>Presumably it does not
>mean a physical standing among others. What kind of “standing” and
>what kind of
>”standing among”, then enables you to know who you are? Is this
>”standing” a social
>standing? Do you have a standing per se, i.e. through yourself, or
>is it the others
>that give you a “standing”, to whom you then belong and are “among”?

We can think this configuration of”Others with whom I am too” as
part of the ongoing construction of the “I” built up through its
spoken interpretations engendered (pun intended,for gender is an
important part of it)by the they-self. The possibility of Dasein’s
authenticity may be realized through a modification of its
inauthentic they-self, which modification may be read off of Dasein’s
rhetoric, “the hermeneutic of its everyday concernful dealings.” But
again, one must make a choice”: to reflect inward from the inward,
productive side of one’s rhetoric, or to remain facing outward, keep
talking, and perhaps win the election.

Regards,

Allen

Posted on Sunday, May 4th, 2008 at 6:01 am
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback