Self-Identity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?
April 28th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Self-Identity for All Reality Types? :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Self-Identity for All Reality Types? :: - True for All Reality Types?
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Self-Identity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?
>
> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>>>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
> >>>>>>>>throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>>>I have addressed your premise 3. I have expressed my skepticism of
> >>>>>it. let me summarize and extend my critique of this premise.
>
> >>>>>1: it is *your* premise; and, therefore, *you* need to support it.
> >>>>>you have not told us anything about your attempts (if any) to look
> >>>>>for evidence. what was your evidence detection criteria? did you do
> >>>>>a complete census of a certain domain or did you just search a
> >>>>>representative sample of that domain?
>
> >>>>Not just me, Joe. Hume tried too. So have a multitude of
> >>>>philosophers since Descartes.
>
> okay; so, your position is popular; but, popularity is not evidence of
> truth.
>
> >>>>Apparently Joseph Polanik is the first in modern times to have
> >>>>found positive evidence for whatever entity it is that supposedly
> >>>>remains identical throughout all human perception. Care to enlighten
> >>>>us, as well as western history?
>
> >>>no; that’s not my job. it’s up to you to justify your negative
> >>>conclusion. I’m merely expressing my skepticism of your argument.
>
> >>>you are in the position of the european zoologist who reported the
> >>>results of a survey of the swan population 300 years ago. “I found no
> >>>evidence of black swans. therefore (by means of evidence-based
> >>>logical deduction), I conclude that there are no black swans.”
>
> >nice try, but you missed the vital difference: it remained a logical
> >possibility 300 years ago that humans could encounter black swans. But
> >there is no logical possibility that humans can encounter what is
> >non-phenomenal (like your reality types 1 and 3), since whatever is
> >encountered is by definition a phenomenon to us. Any evidence for your
> >reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically impossible.
>
> >Of course we all know that you didn’t really “miss” this argument,
> >since it’s simply Hume’s argument against concluding to anything
> >non-phenomenal from the phenomenal
>
> not so fast, Anthony.
>
> we were discussing phenomenological realities only; including, but not
> limited to, the phenomenological reality of reflective self-awareness.
>
> when I asked you to specify which reality type your argument applied to
> (ie what was the reality type of the I that could draw a skeptical
> conclusion as to its own existence), you replied that your argument
> applied to any reality type [2008-03-29]
>
> I replied [2008-04-02]:
>
> >that’s a pretty strong statement. you are claiming that your argument
> >remains true when applied to an I of any reality type. in a sense,
> >you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a variable which ranges over a
> >certain set of proposed reality types. you say the argument “covers all
> >three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are not phenomenal,
> >while I-2 is phenomenal”.
>
> >so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
> >merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
> >chosen reality type.
>
> >ok. I choose the I-3.
>
> >to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
> >prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
> >that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
> >is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
>
> >[NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
> >I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
> >or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
>
> you’ve never even *attempted* to explain how you know your argument
> applied to meta-phenomenal (a.k.a. non-phenomenal) reality types.
