Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe
December 1st, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe :: Claim 2 :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> >>it sounds to me like your universe consists of 1 experiencing subject
> >>(you) and any number of experienced phenomena — some of which
> >>phenomena are claiming to be experiencing subjects also;
>
> >not my universe, but yours … that is, if you continue to make the
> >distinctions that you have been making between types 1,2,3.
>
> well, then we are back to the double standard of evidence. we both agree
> that we have phenomenological evidence only; we crack open Hume’s skull;
> we both observe the brain; and, you claim that *you* can conclude that
> Hume has a brain;
type 2
> but, you claim I can not conclude that Hume has a
> brain.
types 1 or 3
It would be a double standard only if it was the same type in both cases.
> how does that follow from the fact that I have defined ‘existence’,
> ‘reality’ and ‘being’ the way that I have defined these words?
because you granted that any human observation is phenomenal. That would
include observations of a brain through a cracked skull.
> while you’re at it, would you name describe the reality types (or modes
> of existence or modes of being) that you recognize?
the type Heidegger recognizes. Namely, one prior to the “reality vs.
phenomenon” distinction in the first place.
> it seems that we both agree that we can’t give a plausible explanation
> of how an I-2 can be self-instantiating.
>
> does it not follow that the I-2 must be instantiated by something else?
not if I-1 and I-3 are not only without evidence, but also inconceivable.
