Heidegger

Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>well, then we are back to the double standard of evidence. we both
>>agree that we have phenomenological evidence only; we crack open
>>Hume’s skull; we both observe the brain; and, you claim that *you* can
>>conclude that Hume has a brain;

>type 2

>>but, you claim I can not conclude that Hume has a brain.

>types 1 or 3

>It would be a double standard only if it was the same type in both
>cases.

okay, I think I now see what you are saying; and, if so, you are
correct. there is only a double standard if we are drawing conclusions
about the same reality type(s).

if we stood side by side while our trusted servant, Igor, cracked open
Hume’s skull; then, I would say “I-2 experience seeing a (type 2) brain;
and, I-2 conclude that Hume actually has a (type 1) brain”. you, on the
other hand, would only say the first part, something like “I-2
experience seeing a (type 2) brain”. is that reasonably accurate?

if so, can you explain how you conclude that there are other instances
of phenomenal awareness besides your own?

>>it seems that we both agree that we can’t give a plausible explanation
>>of how an I-2 can be self-instantiating. does it not follow that the
>>I-2 must be instantiated by something else?

>not if I-1 and I-3 are not only without evidence, but also
>inconceivable.

how could either of these possibilities be inconceivable?

I’ve pointed out before that I would agree that certain contradictory
ideas (eg. square circles) are inconceivable; but, you’ve not shown how
there is a similar logical contradiction inherent in the idea that there
is a physical universe independent of my experience of it; or, in the
idea that a part of that (a brain) might be responsible for generating
the I-2?

the belief that the I-1 generates the I-2 is, by far, the dominant
theory held by those working (or just debating) in the field of
consciousness research. why should I conclude that all these intelligent
people are grossly mistaken as to the conceivability of their theory?

>>how does that follow from the fact that I have defined ‘existence’,
>>’reality’ and ‘being’ the way that I have defined these words?

>because you granted that any human observation is phenomenal. That
>would include observations of a brain through a cracked skull.

if you are claiming that some or all human observation is not
phenomenal; then, would you say what it is? how is it that my
observation of Hume’s brain is phenomenological but your observation of
Hume’s brain is not phenomenological?

>>while you’re at it, would you name describe the reality types (or
>>modes of existence or modes of being) that you recognize?

>the type Heidegger recognizes. Namely, one prior to the “reality vs.
>phenomenon” distinction in the first place.

are you saying that you have one reality type, being? if so, how do you
account for Heidegger’s claim that this being-here has a particular mode
of being, the existential mode of being?

do you mean by ‘reality’ something similar to what I mean by
‘metaphenomenal reality’ — something that is real and independent of
my experience of it? if so; then, how is it you can conclude from
phenomenal data that there is at least one such reality while claiming
that I can not draw the same conclusion from the same data.

also, on what basis do you claim that being is prior to the phenomenonal
reality vs meta-phenomenonal reality distinction?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Sunday, December 2nd, 2007 at 10:45 pm
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