Heidegger

Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>if we stood side by side while our trusted servant, Igor, cracked open
>>Hume’s skull; then, I would say “I-2 experience seeing a (type 2)
>>brain; and, I-2 conclude that Hume actually has a (type 1) brain”.
>>you, on the other hand, would only say the first part, something like
>>”I-2 experience seeing a (type 2) brain”. is that reasonably accurate?

>Yes

>>can you explain how you conclude that there are other instances of
>>phenomenal awareness besides your own?

>I couldn’t.

couldn’t … what? couldn’t conclude that there are other instances of
phenomenal awareness besides your own; or, couldn’t explain how you draw
that conclusion?

>>I’ve pointed out before that I would agree that certain contradictory
>>ideas (eg. square circles) are inconceivable; but, you’ve not shown
>>how there is a similar logical contradiction inherent in the idea that
>>there is a physical universe independent of my experience of it; or,
>>in the idea that a part of that (a brain) might be responsible for
>>generating the I-2?

>because any human *concept* is phenomenal, simply in virtue of being a
>mental or sensual human experience.

>So if any human concept is phenomenal, then it would be impossible for
>there to be any concept that is not phenomenal.

>So since types 1 and 3 are not phenomenal, then it would be impossible
>for there to be any concept of types 1 and 3.

concepts and sensations are themselves type two realities; but, as you
have undoubtedly noticed, some concepts and sensations/perceptions
purport to be ‘about’ realities of other types.

obviously, one can form concepts and one can construct speculations
concerning metaphenomenal realities — otherwise, how could I have said
anything you could disagree with concerning metaphenomenal realities.
people have long wondered whether any part of the human being survives
the death of its body. answers may vary, or course, as they always have;
but, you would be hard pressed to defend the claim that no human has
ever been able to wonder if there was anything more than the experience
of this passing show.

similarly, the dominant theory in the field of consciousness research is
that the I-1 brain generates the I-2 experiencer. while you may doubt
its correctness, it seems unlikely that you would ever be able to defend
the claim that no researcher was ever able to construct a theory
involving a metaphenomenal reality.

>>if you are claiming that some or all human observation is not
>>phenomenal; then, would you say what it is?

>All *observations* are phenomenal. But the word, “observations,” is
>already a characterization that carries many metaphysical assumptions
>and distinctions along with it (e.g., the one observing VS. the
>observed). What Heidegger says is that at first there are no such
>distinctions at all (either epistemologically OR ontologically), but
>only a primordial dealing with beings in which there is no metaphysical
>distinction between one dealing and “something” dealt with. He gives
>the example of a hammer - before a hammer is a substance distinct from
>the thing holding it and possessing certain attributes etc., it is
>simply good for hammering. He does not simply mean this
>”epistemologically,” as if it were just we who haven’t made this
>distinctions.

physicists have also discovered that our naive concepts concerning
observation are in need of modification; but, they didn’t conclude that
we have no evidence of any metaphenomenal reality.

is the “primordial dealing with beings” nothing more than the
interaction of type 2 realities?

>>>>while you’re at it, would you name describe the reality types (or
>>>>modes of existence or modes of being) that you recognize?

>>>the type Heidegger recognizes. Namely, one prior to the “reality vs.
>>>phenomenon” distinction in the first place.

>>are you saying that you have one reality type, being?

>at first, yes.

>>if so, how do you account for Heidegger’s claim that this
>>being-here has a particular mode of being, the existential mode of
>>being?

>If you mean Dasein, he says that Dasein is precisely NOT a being. That
>is precisely its particular distinction - that it is NOT a distinct
>particular.

in Heidegger’s vocabulary, ‘being’ is what we share with protons,
chairs, toe fungus and dogs; but, dasein always already is as the
characteristically human mode of being; so, ‘dasein’ probably ought to
be translated as ‘existing here’ or ‘this existing here’ depending on
your preference for particular vs class nouns.

in any event, how are we to conclude that there is only one dasein when
the phenomenological evidence is that there are other instances of
phenomenal awareness out there?

>>on what basis do you claim that being is prior to the
>>phenomenonal reality vs meta-phenomenonal reality distinction?

>It’s not a proven conclusion, but a possible alternative to the view
>that the reality vs. phenomena distinction is fundamental for human
>being. My reasons for philosophically preferring that alternative is
>that making the reality vs. phenomena distinction led precisely to the
>denial of reality, or at least to total skepticism about our ability to
>reach reality. From Hume to Husserl, that was precisely what happened
>in the history of Western thought. For a long time the only conceivable
>conclusion was a skeptical one - that we simply cannot make any claims
>about reality.

I suspect that less extreme conclusions were also conceivable. for
example, one might look at the history of western philosophy and the
history of western science and conclude that, while philosophers have
not found any way to draw reliable conclusions about existential reality
(type 1), scientists have found ways to do that.

skepticism in the history of philosophy is not the problem. the
philosopher’s unwillingness to aim it at the philosopher is at least a
part of the problem.

>Heidegger proposed a new solution - that human encounter with beings
>is not primordially that of an observer or knower vs. observed
>”reality” in the first place.

I suspect that Heidegger has been systematically mistranslated. it seems
that words which in german are etymologically related to ‘being’ have
been translated into english words that are etymologically related to
‘being’; and, similarly for words etymologically related to ‘existing’.

the problem with such a mechanistic approach to translation is that
Heidegger’s intended meanings are assigned to the opposite of the word
that carries that meaning in ordinary english. for example, in english
we are accustomed to saying that things exists — that protons, chairs,
toe fungus and dogs exist (as physical objects). we are also accustomed
to saying that humans are beings, or that humans have being or that
humans manifest Being or some such thing.

if we first re-aligned Heidegger’s vocabulary so that his intended
meaning was translated in matching english useage; then, Heidegger’s
solution, as you’ve just described it, would be a viable claim (although
not a new one).

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Monday, December 10th, 2007 at 11:40 am
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