Heidegger

Schizo-Epistemology: Supporting Heidegger Vacuously At Best

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>================================
>>The Premises
>>================================

>>Professor Crifasi’s major premise is that the proposition ‘I remain
>>self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
>>of existence.

>>this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:

>>[1]: P -> Q

>>where

>>P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
>>Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’

>>Professor Crifasi’s minor premise is the claim that Q is false; so:

>>[2]: -Q

>>================================
>>Commentary on The Premises
>>================================

>>{1}: the premises as stated appear to allow a modus tollens operation
>>to conclude -P, ‘I do not exist’ or ‘I am nothing’. however, since
>>premise [1] is a conditional, it is derivable from the negation of its
>>own antecedent. check the truth table for the proposition:

>>-P -> (P -> Q)

>>[this is a logical truth of the propositional calculus. it is theorem
>>51 in EJ Lemmon’s _Beginning Logic_ p 59]

>>thus, despite giving the appearance of a rational *argument*,
>>Professor Crifasi has simply assumed (-P & -Q).

>>{2}: given [2], it is known that [1] can only be vacuously true or
>>completely false.

>This was part was explicitly addressed at the end of this the following
>post:

>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-May/033975.html

>Yet another example of ignoring my prior responses.

[it would help, Professor, if you followed the advice of the moderator
to quote the relevant material instead of linking to the entire post
(which in your case is usually extremely verbose since you often combine
responses to many separate posts). that way one doesn’t have to guess at
what you think is a reply to the issue in question].

are you claiming the following is your response to the question about
vacuity?

>A vacuous conditional is still true.

a vacuous conditional is a vacuous conditional. true; but, that is
itself a vacuous tautology (to borrow Michael E’s phrase).

>And if the conditional (”If I
>exist, then I remain self-identical”) is true, then you cannot question
>this self-identity without also questioning your existence,

let’s not get distracted, Professor. the question is *whether* your
premise is vacuous or false.

given [2], the conditional is true only if its *antecedent is false*.
— only if -P is true.

thus, the truth of your major premise, [1], *assumes* -P (’I do not
exist’ or ‘I am nothing’); and, is in fact derivable from -P which is
what you are trying to conclude via modus tollens; so, you have clearly
*assumed your own conclusion*.

are we hearing you correctly?

are you saying that the *premise* of your argument is ‘I do not
exist’ or ‘I am nothing’?

independently of your answer to that question, are you saying that the
*conclusion* of your argument (whether interim or final) is ‘I do not
exist’ or ‘I am nothing’?

thank you in advance for clarifying just what you are claiming.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, June 8th, 2008 at 6:01 am
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