Symptoms as Evidence
May 25th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence
Tudor Georgescu wrote:
>Sorry to intrude. I did not follow your discussion, but I think I
>already have an objection. It pertains to the title of the dispute.
>It says “schizo-epistemology”. I think that Heidegger’s epistemology
>(if any) is monophrenic. But not in the psychotherapeutic meaning, but
>it means “one mind”, namely that spirit (or soul) is one with nature.
>Unity of awareness and reality.
>My two cents are that if Heidegger had any epistemology, then it is
>certainly a monophrenic one.
the title alludes to Professor Crifasi’s use of one of the symptoms of
schizophrenia (the loss of the first-person perspective) as evidence
supporting his hidden assumption and interim conclusion, “I do not
exist”. it’s as if he were suggesting that the one true philosophy would
assist people to voluntarily adopt the perspective that the
brain-rotting, cat-manure parasite (toxoplasma gondii) inflicts on the
unfortunate victims of schizophrenia.
ordinarily it would help if I summarized the argument thus far; but, I
have been asking the Professor to clarify a few points before going any
further; so, in the event that the Professor deigns to clarify those
points, the following may be subject to some slight revisions.
================================
The Point of the Argument
================================
Professor Crifasi is supposedly trying to reduce nubile young
undergraduates (and other opponents) to skepticism so that they will
become more receptive to his second argument — the one in favor of
Heideggerian philosophy. however, that second argument is nowhere in
evidence; so, this whole exercise makes one wonder if the good professor
took lessons from the Nixon peace plan episode.
================================
The Premises
================================
Professor Crifasi’s major premise is that the proposition ‘I remain
self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
of existence.
this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
[1]: P -> Q
where
P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
Professor Crifasi’s minor premise is the claim that Q is false; so:
[2]: -Q
================================
Commentary on The Premises
================================
{1}: the premises as stated appear to allow a modus tollens operation to
conclude -P, ‘I do not exist’ or ‘I am nothing’. however, since premise
[1] is a conditional, it is derivable from the negation of its own
antecedent. check the truth table for the proposition:
-P -> (P -> Q)
[this is a logical truth of the propositional calculus. it is theorem 51
in EJ Lemmon’s _Beginning Logic_ p 59]
thus, despite giving the appearance of a rational *argument*, Professor
Crifasi has simply assumed (-P & -Q).
{2}: given [2], it is known that [1] can only be vacuously true or
completely false.
================================
The Alleged Evidence
================================
Professor Crifasi’s argument for [1] is based on the claim that denying
[1] “would be denying an identical referent for the identical first
person pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life”
— and the associated claim that this consequence of denying [1] is
(somehow) a bad thing.
however, there is no particular problem that I can see with denying that
the referent of ‘I’ is always
there are numerous problems here. among the more obvious:
{1}: the first-person singular pronoun is not necessarily
self-identical.
there is only one first-person singular pronoun in vernacular english
(assuming you exclude case inflections); but, nothing prevents anyone
from creating others; and, when necessary to avoid ambiguity, I use a
set of first-person singular pronouns subscripted by reality type. see http://what-am-i.net/symbology.htm.
{2}: People Age
on my 35th birthday I say ‘I am 35 years old’. on my 45th birthday I say
‘I am 45 years old’. each statement is true when uttered even though the
referent of one statement is not 100% identical in every way to the
referent of the other statement.
{3}: people change over time
the counseling profession is devoted to breaking inappropriate
assumptions as to self-identity over time. often, a counselee is helped
to understand that “I am not the person I once was” or “I can change”.
lacking actual arguments, Professor Crifasi’s replies invoke psychiatric
symptomatology to justify his philosophical claims:
>the relevant cases from the “counseling profession,” are the ones in
>which people stop referring to themselves in the past by the first
>person pronoun. Those in the “counseling profession” consider that to
>be a sign of a complete break in self-identity (e.g., schizophrenia, in
>which the different “selves” refer to each other in the 3rd person).
>Hence, those in the “counseling profession” agree with me that the
>identity of the first person pronoun is necessarily tied to
>self-identity.
>The “counseling profession” considers losses of the first person
>perspective to be indicative of a rift in self-identity itself, since
>their diagnosis is that there would then literally be several selves.
>The implied assumption, therefore, is that the first person perspective
>is necessarily tied to self-identity. You, on the other hand, have been
>attempting to counter that the consistent use of the first person
>pronoun is not necessarily tied to identity in the referent at all. So
>the very “counseling profession” that you cited before disagrees with
>you.
thus, the power of the cat manure parasite to rob its victims of the
first-person perspective is considered (by the Professor, anyway) as
evidence that the Professor’s major premise is vacuously true rather
than completely false. exactly how such ‘evidence’ supports said
conclusion has not yet been adequately explained.
and the Professor has made no attempt to explain how proving his own
major premise to be vacuous (instead of false) provides any support for
Heideggerian philosophy.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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