Symptoms as Evidence
May 25th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Symptoms as Evidence
Tudor Georgescu wrote:
> >Sorry to intrude. I did not follow your discussion, but I think I
> >already have an objection. It pertains to the title of the dispute.
>
> >It says “schizo-epistemology”. I think that Heidegger’s epistemology
> >(if any) is monophrenic. But not in the psychotherapeutic meaning, but
> >it means “one mind”, namely that spirit (or soul) is one with nature.
> >Unity of awareness and reality.
>
> >My two cents are that if Heidegger had any epistemology, then it is
> >certainly a monophrenic one.
Joe responded with:
> the title alludes to Professor Crifasi’s use of one of the symptoms of
> schizophrenia (the loss of the first-person perspective) as evidence
> supporting his hidden assumption and interim conclusion, “I do not
> exist”. it’s as if he were suggesting that the one true philosophy would
> assist people to voluntarily adopt the perspective that the
> brain-rotting, cat-manure parasite (toxoplasma gondii) inflicts on the
> unfortunate victims of schizophrenia.
Also sorry to intrude but it seems to me that genuine philosophy can handle
quite well simultaneous and radically different points of view since points
of view (opinions, judgments, statements, angles, takes, etc) are not the
point [sic] of philosophy, only starting points to be transscended even
transgressed (in the ingress and egress of the beings of thinking). To the
extent that Heidegger produces real philosophy in my sense, his thinking
cannot be described in terms of bogus psychoanalytic or psychopathological
categories; such a reduction is laughable in the face of real thinking. And,
if I have to, I agree with Tudor that if Heidegger absolutely has to be seen
in such lowly and utterly inappropriate terms then his thinking is overly if
anything “mono-phrenic”. To some his apparent lack of dialectical cut and
thrust easily leads to the(ir) problem of all single-voiced thinking: that
it cannot account for its self without moving outside its self or to the
problem of a self-sustaining, self-generating nexus (as in Nietzsche’s
will-to-power, Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy,
ethnomethodology’s folk-ways, etc). For all his dialectical brilliance, I
think this latter problem also adheres nicely to Marx…
To those that think in an overly linear fashion (e.g., one that is saturated
with mathematical logic and other technics), Heidegger’s disdain for
squaring the circle, dissolving paradoxes and viscous [sic] circles in the
cheap acid of too hastily applied logical apparatuses, hammering home the
non-literary non-merely-word-play ‘point’ of chiasmuses, etc, must appear as
a display of error of logic or a dismissal of it: rather, such Heideggerian
reluctance is designed to uncover the thinkerly tension that arises in
non-completion, the un-remedied setting apart of what belongs together in
polemos, the restless ringing of silence at the very heart of all thinkerly
discourse. This has nothing to do with any kind of so-called
“schizophrenia”; rather, it is to do with thinking be-ing.
regards
michaelP
