Taking Care of Isness
February 3rd, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: taking Care of Isness :: Taking Care of Isness :: Modes of Being :: Isness, Nominata and Quantifiers
Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being
one), and say: God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the
conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all
its predicates.
In a message dated 02/02/2008 23:16:32 GMT Standard Time,
_jPolanik at nc.rr.com_ (mailto:jPolanik@nc.rr.com) writes: Taking Care of Isness
the conversation seems to have died down as to some points; so, perhaps,
this might be a good time to summarize the various positions taken on the
question of isness, the meaning, if any, of ‘is/am’.
1: The Context
_Being and Time_, as Heidegger admits, is not completely grounded.
“The considerations which follow will not have been grounded in full detail
until the ‘cogito sum’ has been phenomenologically destroyed.” [BaT. 123].
the ‘phenomenological destruction’ of the Cartesian ‘I am’ was scheduled for
Part 2, Division 2 of BaT; but, as we all know, that section never appeared..
consequently, it follows that an unprejudiced evaluation of the ground upon
which the Heideggerian corpus stands (or fails to stand) requires a
confrontation between the Cartesian ‘I am’ and the
Heideggerian ‘I am’.
1.1: The Common Ground
it is well known that Descartes accepts ‘I am’ as a true statement; for, ‘I
am’ is what survives the doubting of all that can be doubted.
Jud:
No it does not. The statement *I am* could be inscribed upon a two thousand
year old gravestone above a grave wherein is to be found nothing but dust. As
for the living utterer of such a phrase, to say *I am* is simply to exist in
the modality of saying: *I am* or saying *I speak English.* It is the
capacity to say *I* which conceptually instantiates the person who, revelling in
his knowledge of English personal pronouns, might well to proceed to break
amazingly new Cartesian ground by saying: *I am me.*
Joe:
less well known is that Heidegger also accepts ‘I am’ as a true statement.
Jud:
It is comforting to know that the great man of used French Letters
acknowledged that he existed. It puts his placement of the signal-candle in the window
of his study into perspective as a real happening, rather than a ghastly
ghostly interlude. As to providing an answer to Heidegger’s putative
self-questioning: *what am I?* We can happily leave that to Elfride and the Gestapo thug
at the other end of the telephone when she put in the call which cost her
husband his job as the ever errectile rectal errector with the ever-awaiting
dripping candle.
Joe:
in discussing the first-person viewpoint inherent in any Dasein, Heidegger
writes “Because Dasein has in each case mineness, one must always use a
personal pronoun when one addresses it.” [BaT. 68] one of the two paradigmic
examples he gives is ‘I am’ (the other is ‘you are’).
1.2: The Problem: Identifying the Point(s) of Contention
since Heidegger promises to deconstruct the Cartesian ‘I am’, one may
reasonably conclude that, as of the time BaT was written, Heidegger disagreed with
Descartes on one or more points; but, … which point(s)?
since they started out from a common ground, it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that, if we specify Descartes’ path in sufficient detail, we will be able
to identify the point at which the road forked and each philosopher went his
own way.
1.3: The Hypothesis
moments after concluding (early in the Second Meditation) that he could not
falsely assert ‘I am’, Descartes realizes “I do not yet have a sufficient
understanding of what this ‘I’ is” and immediately begins asking ‘what am I?’
Descartes’ understanding, abstracted from his method (universal doubt) of
reaching it, is not other than the Claim of Partial Ignorance, the CPI: I know
that I am; but, not what I am.
hence, by his own admission, those portions of Heidegger’s philosophy that
are inconsistent with the CPI are invalid until the promised but never
delivered deconstruction of the Cartesian ‘I am’ is supplied by someone else.
2: Arguments to the Contrary
many arguments against the hypothesis were by those favorable inclined
toward Heidegger’s views. these include:
2.1: Reasonable People Don’t Ask ‘What Am I?’
it was suggested that brain damaged or delirious individuals might ask ‘who
am I?’. it does not follow that rational thinkers do not and can not
sincerely wonder ‘what am I?’. indeed, it would seem obvious that anyone who ever
wondered if there was a part of the human individual that survived the death of
its body or who had questions concerning the structure of the human
individual is in effect asking ‘what am I?’.
Jud:
Such people as you describe simply belong to the first category without
being aware of it. No intelligent person would ever seriously ask *What am I?*
A drugged-up trannie or budding Buddha-nut might wonder: *What part of me
exists after I pop my clogs?* but at the same time be perfectly aware that all
along he was in fact Freddie Fernackerpan of 23 Railway Cuttings, Cheam.
Joe: this argument seems rather implausible.
Jud:
Then check out Freddie’s existence if you don’t believe me. Here is his
e-mail address: _ffernackerpan at aol.com_ (mailto:ffernackerpan@aol.com)
Joe:
2.2: I Always Already Know What I Am.
it is alleged, based on the authority of Hegel, that philosophical inquiry
never uncovers new knowledge; but, only that which we already know.
as a vague generality, this one might even be true; and, in any case, Plato
said much the same thing with his doctrine of knowledge as remembrance.
however, this generality does not in itself answer the ‘what am I?’ question. to
obtain an actual answer one needs an additional argument.
it was alleged that ‘is’ or ‘am’ is a stand-alone predicate which asserts
being; and, hence, that ‘I am’
