Taking Care of Isness
February 6th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: taking Care of Isness :: Taking Care of Isness :: Defining Ontology :: Using the Is of Isness to State the Obvious
GEVANS613 at aol.com wrote:
>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:
>GEVANS613@aol.com wrote:
>Joe: it is not possible to say ‘I am’ ‘I exist’ as this begs the >question as to the reality type (or mode of existence) of the utterer >of ‘I am’. is the utterer a reality (or an existent) of type 1, 2 or 3?
>Jud: There is no such thing as a *reality type.* Reality types do not >exist. Only what is real exists.
you wouldn’t tell your nine children that they are only real in the same sense that an optical illusion is real. neither would you tell them that they only exist in the same sense that an optical illusion exists.
schematically: not every [root predicate] has the same [root predicate]-type.
concretely (one version): not all realities have the same reality type.
>Joe: in the act of asserting ‘I am’, the utterer knows only ‘I-2 am a >phenomenological reality’ (type 2). it does not know its own origin — >whether it is generated by the I-1 (an existent such as the brain), the >I-3 (a being such as a self or soul or mind), both working together or >in some other way.
>Jud: There is no dichotomy betwixt brain and body.
I agree that there is no dichotomy between brain and body; but, the question is whether there is a non-physical component of the human individual; and, if so, does it contribute to generating the phenomenological experiencer.
>Joe: the structure (the presence of Being or of a being) within the >human individual can not be made to depend on ‘who’ a person is. many >of the atrocities of history are ideologically grounded to this >confusion of ‘who’ and ‘what’.
>Jud: *Being* does not exist [confirmed by the Philosopher of Nazism) >so how could it be structured?
the question concerns the structure of the human individual. is there Being or a being within the human individual.
I expressed no opinion concerning the structure of Being.
>>Jud: In a typical sentence such as: ‘The cat is black,’ the cat’s >>worldly presence is established as soon as it is named as: *the cat.*
>Joe: saying ‘the unicorn is blue’ does not establish the worldly >presence of the unicorn.
>Jud: It all depends upon context and antecedal considerations.
you can’t use the word ‘is’ to establish a metaphenomenal reality — that’s the ontological argument, is it not?
when Kant said ‘God is’ did that establish the worldly precence of God?
>Jud: I notice that you never situate your *what am I? questioner in >any real world situation. The whole thing would blow up in your face if >you did.
quite right, as you are not the first to notice. Descartes resolved not to alter the mundane aspects of life while he conducted his meditations. Marcel makes the same point in _The Mystery of Being_ where he ponders the question ‘who am I?’ He notes, that despite the deep philosophical considerations he addresses, one must continue to give one’s same old name when filling out identity forms.
“I should be guilty of telling a lie if I varied the entries from form to form … If this form-filling is a game, it is a game I am forced to play.” [Marcel, Gabriel. The Mystery of Being, Vol 1. Gateway Edition. p. 104]
Nevertheless, he goes on to ponder the mystery: “really, who am I?” and later, “who am I, really?”
>>>Joe: one may, for example, assert that ‘I am’ ‘I am not nothing’. >>>so long as this meaning is attributed to an implicit complement when >>>it is not stated explicitly, there is no contradiction to Heidegger’s >>>claim that ‘is’ and, by extension, ‘am’ are ‘empty’.
>>Jud: To do that would be to act like the moronic Plato (an idiot who >>still haunts us and shambles along the corridors of shame) who claimed >>that /*to mae on*/ [that which is not] was the holeronic *other of >>/*to on*/ [that which is) and therefore was itself a sort of >>/*being.*/
>Joe: Plato *was* being foolish here. if ‘being’ is the root predicate; >then, for any x that is, x is a being. consequently, there is nothing >left over for ‘nonbeing’ to refer to. and, yet, ‘nonbeing’ is a real >word. this confuses some people.
>Jud: You used a similar ploy yourself recently Joe - so dont put all >the blame on the Greek bum-boy. I cant be bother looking back at the >messages but you employed a holeron yourself *the I am and the I am >not* was it not?
you have me confused with someone else.
Joe
— Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the first person. — H-N Castaneda
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