terror and error
June 3rd, 2006, search relatedRelated posts :: terror and error :: terror and error :: terror and error :: terror and error
Tags: ontology and terror
— michaelP wrote:
> > Heidegger appears to feel that terror is something that must be dealt
> > with; i.e. avoiding it would be inauthentic.
> >
> > “So the man that truly knows is not the one who blindly runs
> > after a truth but only the one who constantly knows all three
> > way, that of Being, that on non-Being, and that of seeming.
> > Superior knowing–and all knowing is superiority–is granted
> > only to one who has experienced the sweeping storm on the way
> > of Being, to whom the terror of the second way to the abyss
> > of Nothing has not remained foreign, and who has still taken
> > over the third, the way of seeming, as a constant urgency.”
> > IM, 120
> >
> > So to summarize, don’t seek shelter from the storm. Get wet.
> > If you won’t risk getting hit by lightning, you ain’t goin’
> > nowhere.
>
> So, Pete, briefly, given Heidegger’s take on Parmenides three ways,
To help keep everyone on the page, preceeding the paragraph above
is this:
“The threefold path provides this indication, unitary in itself:
The way of Being is unavoidable.
The way of Nothing is inaccessible.
The way to seeming is always accessible and traveled,
but it can be avoided.”
> it would
> seem that in order to think terror one must not flinch from being terrorised
> by such a thinking, that the path of the seeming urgency of terror (the
> error of terror) should be viewed as itself a necessory terrorism to be
> borne?
Heidegger says the second way (of Nothing–terror of the abyss) is
(1) inaccessible, and (2) must not be foreign. So yes, it is
necessary for Dasein and flinching would be an error. I understand
this terror of the abyss to also be part of the mystery of
concealment discussed earlier this week. Even though it is
inaccessible, one must be aware of it and get as near to it as
possible. In section 5 of the Contributions: “Deep awe is the way
of getting nearer and remaining near to what is most remote as
such, that in its hinting–when held in deep awe–still becomes
the nearest and gathers in itself all relations of beyng.”
That said, about the terror of the abyss, I wonder if the terror
of terrorism might not be more usefully studied as a mood.