Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>jimstuart51 wrote:

>>>jPolanik wrote:

>>>>so, how do I determine that I am a dasein instead of a mind, or
>>>>spirit or soul or a group of neurons or a quantum phenomenon?

>>>Heidegger gives reasons for thinking that I am a Dasein in B&T. He
>>>also gives reasons for thinking I am not an immaterial soul or a
>>>group of neurons or a quantum phenomenon in that text.

>>in an earlier post you referred me to sections 12 and 13 or BaT. in
>>these sections Heidegger talks a lot about dasein as
>>’Being-in-the-world’. now, clearly, the human body is in the world. it
>>is a physical object like any other. we eat food and the atoms from
>>the food become incorporated into the body. bodily waste products and
>>the body itself after its death are recycled by the physical universe
>>into other entities.

>What you are describing is what Heidegger says he does NOT mean by
>Being-in, at SuZ 54. He does not mean a physical thing inside the
>physical universe. He calls what he means “Being-alongside,” which he
>describes at Suz 54-55.

1. Situation

BaT section 12 [H:53-60], opens with “Dasein is an entity which in each
case I myself am”, an echo of section 9 where Heidegger wrote “We are
ourselves the entities to be analysed”.

if I translate these statements into the first person, I get something
like “I am myself this entity” or, more simply, “I am *this*” — the
awareness that prompts the next question: how do I determine that I,
this entity that I myself am, am a dasein instead of a mind, spirit,
soul, a group of neurons, a quantum phenomenon or whatever?

here, knowing that I am *this*, I am seeking that which I inquire about
when I ask ‘what am I?’.

2. Being-In the World vs Being-Alongside the World

I’m not sure it helps to distinguish ‘in’ and ‘alongside’ in relation to
the various meanings of ‘world’ that Heidegger defines in section 14 —
particularly when it is still undecided ‘what’ is in/alongside the
world[usage 1-4].

Heidegger writes:

“The entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which
we have characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am
[bin]. This expression ‘bin’ is connected with ‘bei’, and so ‘ich bin’
[’I am’] means in its turn ‘I reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’ the world, as
that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. ‘Being’ [Sein], as
the infinitive of ‘ich bin’ (that is to say, when it is understood as an
existentiale), signifies ‘to reside alongside …’, ‘to be familiar with
….’. ‘Being-in’ is thus the formal existential expression for the Being
of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.” [Bat p.
80]

this analysis may remind you of an earlier thread in which the origin of
the existential construction was discussed. I will try to summarize.

the ‘absolute signification’ of the verb to be as that phrase is used by
the OED is what linguists call an ‘existential construction’. there are
two formats for the existential construction; but, they are analyzed in
a similar fashion.

the first format looks like a sentence containing a subject, a copula
and no explicitly stated complement. examples would include ‘I am’, ‘you
are’ and ‘it is’ or ‘God is’. the second format has a placeholding
subject such as ‘there’ and the actual subject appears shifted to the
complement position.

an existential construction asserts that its subject ‘is’ but doesn’t
say what it is. so, ‘an even prime number is’ means the same as ‘there
is an even prime number’; but, doesn’t tell you whether numbers are
realities of type 2 or type 3 (I’m just going to assume you won’t try to
find ‘2′ under a rock somewhere).

according to the OED, the existential construction as we know it had its
origin in statements like ‘there is a tree in the garden’ when the
connection to an actual location was severed.

so, when Heidegger analyzes ‘ich bin’ and concludes that it means ‘I
dwell alongside’ he is reverting to the etymological history of the
existential construction as if that governed anyone who says ‘I am’.

ironically, Heidegger *did* catch a glimpse of the significance of the
existential construction: the necessity of a [root-predicate]-typology.

“In the assertions ‘God is’ and ‘the world is’, we assert Being. This
word ‘is’, however, cannot be meant to apply to these entities in the
same sense, when between them there is an infinite difference of Being;
if the signification of ‘is’ were univocal, then what is created would
be viewed as if it were uncreated, or the uncreated would be reduced to
the status of something created.” [BaT p. 126]

of course, my theory is that the ‘naked is’ (the existential
construction) asserts the root predicate only. it is left to us to
decide what [root predicate]-type is appropriate in a given case; and,
that accounts for the multi-vocal ‘is’.

in any event, Heidegger recognizes that there are different senses of
‘is’. consequently, until I decide what sense is asserted of ‘I’ when I
say ‘I am’, how would I decide whether I am in, of, or alongside the
world (even if I previously decided which of the 4 uses of ‘world’ was
appropriate)?

Joe

[All quotes from BaT are from the Macquarrie & Robinson translation]

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Wednesday, February 27th, 2008 at 10:50 am
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