Heidegger

Antonio Rossin wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Antonio Rossin wrote:

>>> maybe one or both of you — or everybody else — can help me
>>>understand.

>>> When I mind about such sentences like “cogito ergo sum”,
>>> “I think therefore I am”, “I experience therefore I exist”, I
>>> remember of another renown sentence, that is “I’m lying,
>>> therefore I’m a liar” –or, of course, its reverse: “I’m saying
>>> the truth, therefore I am (say,a truth-teller)”, and so on.

>>Antonio,

>>1: Syllogism?

>>Descartes consistently denied that the cogito was a syllogism (or
>>what we’d today call deduction by modus ponens); and, defended
>>it as an intuition directly understood to be true. in his Discourse on
>>Method, Descartes describes the sequence of his thoughts.

>>first there was the recognition that he found a necessary truth, ‘I am
>>thinking, therefore I exist’. he proceeds from there to conclude that
>>he is a soul. finally, only now does he pause to wonder what makes
>>this proposition true. he concludes with “I observed that there is
>>nothing at all in the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’
>>to assure me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very
>>clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist.” [CSM I, 127]

>>that’s about the reverse of what usually goes into a modus ponens.
>>one usually has the major premise (P -> Q) and the antecedent (P)
>>separately; and concludes the consequent of the major premise.
>>Descartes arrives at the major premise last.

>>if cogito; ergo, sum does not represent a deduction via modus
>>ponens, what could it be?

>(antonio)

>Joseph,

>First of all, thank you for your understandably argued reply.
>I find it very interesting your “what could it be” question, and
>am curious of the answer you will give it. For the time being,
>my simplest answer would be: “It is a statement by Descartes”

>But I would add another question: Why did he state that? Which
>question opens to two (at least) sub-questions:

>1. Why did he use the concept “I think” to demonstrate that he exists?
>(IMHO, he could have used the concepts / I eat / I sleep / I walk / I
>talk, etc. as well)

Short Answer: because he was not being precise.

Long Answer:

Descartes actually wrote ‘ego cogito, ergo sum’; but, scholars usually
say the ‘Cogito’ is (the proper name of the sentence) ‘cogito, ergo
sum’.

IMO, this should be translated as ‘I experience; thefore, I am’ but
that’s a story for another day.

in any event, if the Cogito argument is properly understood, Descartes
could have used any statement, whether true or false, as the basis from
to assert ‘ergo sum’ — therefore, I am.

suppose I assert ‘I am a turnip’. this statement is false; but, the fact
that I assert it demonstrates (by performance) that I am.

in the Cogito argument, the basis of the forensic inference that I am is
not in the fact that the statement ‘I think’ is itself a thought; nor,
the fact that the statement ‘I experience’ is itself experienced when
made.

the true basis of the Cogito argument is the fact that I am aware that I
am the referent of ‘I’ whenever I say ‘I am self-aware’ (or any other
first person singular statement, whether true or false).

so, let us consider the statement ‘I am self-aware’. if this is in fact
the true basis of the Cogito argument, consideration of this statement
should clarify the argument.

1: I assert ‘I am self-aware’.

2: I recognize that I am the referent of the word ‘I’ whenever I say ‘I
am self-aware’; hence, I am self-aware.

notice the inference that I make from the fact that I assert ‘I am
self-aware’ is *precisely* what the statement itself asserts.

thus ‘I am self-aware’ is self-verifying.

this should clear up any confusion that some people experience having
when they notice that ‘I experience’ is not the same sentence as ‘I am’.

thus, the general meaning of any Cogito-like argument is:

I say ‘I am self-aware’; therefore, I am self-aware.

now, to continue, since nothing unreal is self-aware, I conclude that I
am real in some sense.

but, … while I know that I am, I don’t know in what sense I am.

hence the claim of partial ignorance: I know that I am; but, not what I
am.

hence, I ask ‘what am I’ and psycho-philosophical inquiry proceeds from
there.

Descartes explicitly asks this very question in the second meditation.

Heidegger leaves the question implicit. first, he enjoins every dasein
to address itself in the first person singular; giving, as an example of
what he means, the statement ‘I am’ — precisely the conclusion of
Descartes’ version of the Cogito. [BaT 68/42]

Heidegger then says that ‘is’ doesn’t have just one sense. [BaT 126/93]

thus, the dasein which follows Heidegger’s advice would have to say, ‘I
am this being-here but in what sense of ‘is’ am I’ — a complicated way
of asking ‘what am I’.

Joe

[Antonio, I will respond the other issues you raise in your post at a
later time.]

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, October 12th, 2008 at 6:04 am
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