Heidegger

jimstuart51 wrote:

>Joe,

>I am not an expert on Heidegger, so I hope others with more
>knowledge than myself will respond to your thought-provoking post.
>However, I will offer my own response – no doubt fairly superficial –
>to your questions.

>You write:

>I am hoping this post will provoke discussion on at least these two
>points:

>* has the extent of the common ground been correctly described; or,
>have I included too much or too little?

>* how can Heidegger focus his case against the ‘cogito sum’ (or
>cartesian thinking, generally) so that his own conclusion about
>dasein survive undamaged? >>

>I am not so sure there is as much common ground between Descartes
>and Heidegger as you suggest there is when they enquire about the
>human being by asking ‘what am I?’ (Descartes) or ‘what is dasein?’
>(Heidegger).

>Descartes asks his question in the context of a thought experiment
>in which the outside world has been doubted out of existence.
>Heidegger, on the other hand, asks his question from within the
>world. For Heidegger the starting point for his philosophical
>enquiry is that he finds himself acting in the world. So, in effect,
>he asks himself, “who am I, this being who is acting in the world,
>hammering nails, riding a bicycle, or whatever, in a material world
>where other daseins like myself are doing similar things?”

>Descartes starts his epistemological construction work as an
>immaterial point of consciousness, so it is no wonder he concludes
>that “the ‘I’ is a soul that is distinct from its body and that will
>continue to be even after the body ceases to exist.” Heidegger
>starts as a material being interacting with other beings in a
>material world, so no wonder he concludes that “‘I’ is just a body
>with a highly developed capacity for experiencing and for reflecting
>upon its experiences.”

>I think Heidegger starts in the correct place, but I am not sure
>what argument Heidegger could give (or, indeed, did give) for
>preferring his starting point to that of Descartes.

Hello, Jim, and thanks for the reply.

I’m not convinced that there is a complete difference in methodology.
Descartes doubted all that could be doubted; but, he was hoping to find
something indubitable. Heidegger was more focused. his attempt to
deconstruct the history of ontology can be seen as an attempt at
focusing doubts concerning the knowledge contained in tradtional
ontology. he is looking for something that is revealed (unhidden) after
the deconstruction.

in any event, it remains true that they ended up in different places;
although, arguably, they began from the same clearing in the forest —
an awareness of knowing that I am; but, not what I am.

here is my argument in favor of this claim:

Heidegger’s critique of Descartes seems to be focused on the cogito: I
think; therefore, I am.

Heidegger first claims that this is not an inference as its form might
suggest; and, since Descartes made a similar claim (that there was no
syllogism involved), Heidegger decides the cogito is better stated as ‘I
think I am’.

Heidegger then attacks the ‘I think’ for being too rational and too
mathematical. This is hardly justified because Descartes tells us
plainly that he is using ‘thinking’ as we would use ‘experiencing’. in
more modern language, Descartes was saying ‘I experience; therefore, I
am’.

but, even if Heidegger is attacking a straw man when he is criticizing
the ‘I think’, he leaves the ‘I am’ untouched.

consequently, both accept the first part (I know *that* I am) of the
Claim of Partial Ignorance: I know that I am; but, not what I am.

Descartes, obviously accepts the second part as well; for, moments after
concluding that ‘I am’ is indubitable he writes, “But I do not yet have
a sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is, that now necessarily
exists.” [CSM II, 17]

what about Heidegger? would he also accept initially that I don’t know
what I am?

it seems to me that the answer to this has to be ‘yes’. unless one is
prepared to claim that, in the moment of knowing that I am, I also
(somehow) know what I am; then, there is inevitably a gap during which
my state of awareness or my state of understanding is as described by
the CPI: I know *that* I am; but, not *what* I am.

given the lengthy analysis that follows the opening line of Being and
Time, “We are ourselves the entities to be analysed”, it seems clear
that Heidegger is not claiming that knowing that I am is sufficient for
knowing what I am.

if we translate the opening line into a first person statement, say, ‘I
am this entity which I will analyze’, there is no obvious reason why I
somehow already know that I am a dasein rather than a mind, a soul or a
specific subset of my brain.

consequently, I conclude that the common ground accepted by both
Descartes and Heidegger at least includes an acceptance of the CPI.

so, they must have diverged somewhere along the way to answering a
question like ‘how do I come to know what I am?’.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Thursday, February 14th, 2008 at 9:10 am
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