Heidegger

Cologne 20-Jan-2008

Joseph Polanik schrieb Sat, 19 Jan 2008 14:16:53 -0500:

> Kant on Predicates
>
> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >>>>ME: Kant himself provides an example of a sentence in which ‘is’
> >>>>alone is a predicate,
>
> >>>>JP: Would you provide a cite to the passage in which Kant says that
> >>>>’is’ alone is a predicate?
>
> >>>ME: “Gott ist.” in the context of being as the “existential
> >>>predicate” as distinct from “real predicates” which say WHAT
> >>>something is in its CONCEPT, or Aristtotle’s _to ti estin_ translated
> >>>to the environment of subjectivist metaphysics, which Kant
> >>>consummated..
>
> >>[Kant]: If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates
> >>(including that of almightiness), and say, ‘God is’, or ‘there is a
> >>God’, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only
> >>put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my
> >>concept, as its object.
>
> >>JP: Kant is claiming that:
>
> >>1: we have a concept of God which includes certain predicates (eg
> >>almightiness or omnipotence); and,
>
> >ME: The “concept of God” is God’s “reality” in Kant’s terminology.
>
> JP: oddly enough, the concept associated with ‘God’ is also the reality of
> ‘God’ in my terminology. now, the reality associated with the word ‘God’
> is a phenomenological reality; and, naturally, the next question is
> whether there is a metaphenomenal reality that associated with the
> phenomenological reality associated with the word ‘God’.
>
> this question could be posed with great clarity as ‘does God exist as a
> metaphenomenal reality; and, if so, as an existent or as a being?
>
> [where ‘existent’ is defined as a physical (type 1) reality and ‘being’
> is defined as a non-physical (type 3) reality.]
>
> unfortunately, this existential question is often posed much less
> clearly as ‘is there a God?’ or as ‘does God exist?’.
>
> the corresponding existential statement or existential judgement could
> be posed clearly, ‘God is — as a physical reality’ or ‘God is — as a
> non-physical reality’; but is more often posed less clearly, ‘God is’.
>
> of course, just saying ‘God is’ doesn’t prove that there is a
> metaphenomenal reality associated with the phenomenological reality that
> is the concept associated with ‘God’.
>
> that’s one point of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument.
>
> >>JP: 2: when we say ‘God is’ we do “not put a new predicate to the
> >>concept of God”.
>
> >ME: Correct: ‘Is’ is not a “real predicate” belonging to God’s
> >”reality”, i.e. God’s “concept”, i.e. WHAT God is as a res.
>
> JP: I agree. saying ‘x is’ says of x *THAT* it is; but, NOT *WHAT* it is.
>
> in saying ‘I am’ I assert *THAT* I am; but, NOT *WHAT* I am.
>
> again, QED.
>

ME: Yes, that puts it nicely: asserted, demonstrated — not questioned.

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Posted on Sunday, January 20th, 2008 at 1:50 pm
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