Heidegger

eupraxis at aol.com wrote:

[all quotes from CSM I, 127]

>[Joe]: “for his own purposes (finding a starting point for
>philosophical inquiry), Descartes only has to defend the certainty of
>that starting point.”

>[Wil]: Not really. A starting point may be (and is in this case)
>phenomenally (phenomenologically?) misleading.

a starting point *may* be phenomenologically misleading? ’starting
point’ *is* the traditional term; but, I prefer ‘turning point’ because
it is phenomenologically more accurate. Descartes had to work long and
hard to arrive at the cogito, traditionally called his ’starting’ point,
where he was able to ‘turn’ to the task of building on the certainty he
had found.

>Descartes’ mission is to ground the subject as a thinking thing. He may
>have announced the entrance of thinking as superior to doctrinal
>authority as a starting point (which is the historically significant
>factor of his gesture), but he did not demonstrate the veracity the
>Cartesian subject itself. More to the point, while Descartes announced
>’the thinking’, he left open what the ‘thing’ is (the res of res
>cognitions). Heidegger contends, to make a long story short, that while
>human Dasein may be the local condition for the possibility of human
>thinking, the thinking itself does not define the res cognitans but the
>[transcendental] ground of thinking itself. The subject of thought,
>then, is not the I, by this understanding, but the Ontological ground
>of Dasein’s being. The I is, as it were, passed over, destructed. In
>B&T this destruction is only announced but not formally shown, it is
>true. See H’s work on Kant for a further elaboration.

you have overlooked a key element of Descartes’ project: grounding
*claims* as to the meta-phenomenal origins of the phenomenological
experiencer in the *process of coming to know* that such a claim is
true.

so, with regard to the claims you’ve just mentioned, Heidegger expects
I, this dasein, to simply *believe* that I have been destructed;
whereas, Descartes would expect me to ask ‘how do I know that I have
been destructed in favor of the transcendental ground of thinking
itself?’.

Descartes leaves open the question of what the I is; but, only in the
sense that coming to know *what* I am is a separate step (following
coming to know *that* I am). he does reach his conclusion in the sixth
meditation (or in the next paragraph if you prefer the DoM).

Descartes, immediately after concluding that no malicious demon could
ever make it possible for him to falsely assert ‘I am’, makes a claim of
partial ignorance: I know that I am; but, not what I am. so naturally he
asks ‘what am I?’.

Heidegger seems to agree that there is this two step process of coming
to know that I am and then trying to determine what I am.

in section 43 of _Introduction to Phenomenological Research_ he says:

“But we have to pose the decisive question of how, on the basis of the
way it is determined that and what the res cogitans is, it becomes
apparent what Descartes genuinely sought and found.”

if there is this two step process; then, there is a problem.

Heidegger opens BaT (section 9) with “We are ourselves the entities to
be analysed”. if I translate this into the first person, I get something
like “I am this entity I will analyze’ or “I am *this* which I will
analyze”. so I know that I am; but, not yet what I am.

so, how do I determine that I am a dasein instead of a mind, or spirit
or soul or a group of neurons or a quantum phenomenon?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, February 24th, 2008 at 4:35 pm
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