The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly
June 22nd, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: The misnamed Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: The Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly :: The misnamed Heideggerian Nothing(ness) Anomaly
Michael Eldred wrote:
>Joseph Polanik schrieb Sat, 14 Jun 2008 08:04:32 -0400:
>>Michael Eldred wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik schrieb Wed, 04 Jun 2008 06:47:07 -0400:
>>>>Michael Eldred wrote:
>>>>JP: you are contradicting yourself. above you that I have avoided
>>>>predicating ‘nothing’ by defining it away and that I have made the
>>>>problem vanish by using formally manipulable symbols. you can’t then
>>>>turn around and claim “you cannot avoid predicating of nothing”.
>>>ME You do both. In order to define nothing away, you first have to
>>>distinguish it from something, which necessarily provides also a
>>>predication of nothing.
>>JP: your argument is more legalistic than philosophical. when accused
>>of predicating nothingness, you say: “I didn’t do it; and, if I did,
>>everyone does it”.
>ME: I didn’t say that.
of course, you did. you claim that, despite any efforts to define terms
and use logical symbols to ban the attempt to attribute predicates to
nothing, no one can avoid doing just that.
how is that different from saying ‘everyone does it’.
>I said that, by predicating that something is not nothing, you also
>predicate that nothing is not something. So even before you get to
>define nothing away by shrink-wrapping it down to a minus sign, you
>have predicated that it is not something.
I don’t know whether you presently work in the field of mathematics;
but, you’ve told us that you have two degrees in math and that you’ve
written papers in the field. what do mathematicians say about
attributing predicates to members of the empty set (even though there
are no such members).
mathematicians might say that any x that is something is not a member of
the empty set. would they then spin around like you do and claim that it
follows that a member of the empty set is not a something? in other
words, would professional mathematicians attribute a predicate ‘not
something’ (or, whatever) to ‘member of the empty set’?
what other predicates do you feel may be attributed to members of the
empty set (even though there are no such members)?
>>JP: let’s not go down that road. instead why don’t you deal with
>>something more concrete, a simple assertion that has previously
>>stumped Professor Crifasi:
>>I am self-aware.
>>in the total absence of any reality of any reality type; in the total
>>absence of any existent of any mode of existence; in the total
>>absence of any being of any mode of being; etc., — what asserts ‘I
>>am self-aware’?
>ME: I’ve already long since disposed of this as part of your so-called
>Confession of Partial Ignorance
your attempted ‘disposal’ collapsed when you retracted your denial of
Kant’s claim that being was not a determining predicate.
>since you assert that something is not nothing, the next question is,
>what, precisely, distinguishes nothing from something.
do mathematicians ask ‘what, precisely, distinguishes a member of the
empty set from a member of a non-empty set?’
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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