Heidegger

INTRODUCTION.
There are some works of philosophy, that may be written (and sometimes read) as a sort of austere pursuit of pleasure in the pure delight of watching the thought burgeon and develop in this direction and that. This has been my experience during the writing of this paper. The ‘problem of causation’ has bedevilled philosophy for centuries and it is generally acknowledged to be the last great unsolved ontological question for philosophy. I seek to introduce an alternative version of determinism and challenge the traditional understanding of causality.
I present for your consideration the notion that the existential modalities of all entities are determined combinatorially and hierarchically by the totality of the antecedal catenulate modalities of an infinite material universe, and that its constituent persistent objects (vide: Hume’s billiard balls etc.) are merely sub-holonistic agents or proxies of change deterministically and concatenationally selected by the remote mechanisms of the material imperium. This paper is planned in such a way as to introduce the subject of Eliminative Determinism in sequential stages in an attempt to anticipate questions before they are implied. PART ONE CONTENTS PAGE (1) PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION. Difficulties of discourse can exist between an eliminativist author and persons of more traditionalist persuasions. Potential problems are identified and discussed. Explanations and reassurances are offered in order to mitigate these problems from the start.
(2) THE HOLARCHIC COSMOS. The theory of a holarchic cosmos is introduced. A ‘holon’ can be conceived of both as a hierarchical covariant and contravariant sub-systemic constituent of a larger super-system, whilst contemporaneously super-systemically hosting a constituent cluster of subsystems of its own. (3) ELIMINATIVIST PROPOSITIONS. The Conatus Principle, is re-examined and discussed. An introduction and outline of the basic concepts and ideas for a revivified aetiology of determinism. The ideas introduced here are expanded in a later section entitled: ‘The Material Imperative.’ (3) THE CONATUS PRINCIPLE. Some tangential points of contact between the eliminativist project and aspects of older Spinozean, Cavendishean and Humean metaphysics. (4) THE MATERIAL IMPERATIVE. A key term coined to characterise the physical realm as a ‘materiocracy’ - in which objects exist as the ‘coercers of their own objectivity,’ conditioned by the physical implicature of the sub-systemic and super-systemic relationships in which they exist. (5) THE EVOLUTION OF INSENTIENT OBJECTS An attempt to understand and describe the deterministic evolution of insentient matter and identify what determines change the that takes place when a persistent object is impinged upon by the holarchy. (6) CONCLUSION. How I see the theory developing. The closing paragraphs will seek areas of weakness which need more research. The possibility is explored that there may be empirical gaps of evidence which can be supplied, where such authentication is available or feasible. PART ONE - PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION We are to a certain extent ensnared by the inadequacies of our language. This is especially aggravating when conflicts of definition arise. Having no wish to write up my ideas in the logical symbolisation of ‘Ramsey sentences,’ it behoves me to explain at some length the manner of my approach to conventional English as opposed to language employed in ontological discussion as it is used in this paper. For the hard nominalist, serious determinist and extreme eliminativist only material objects exist. Those objects are of three main kinds: [1] Animal objects both sentient and insensate. [2] Non – animal insentient biological objects. [3] Insentient objects, wave-forms, force-fields. Human animal objects exist as communicative entities. There are other animal objects, that can communicate to a much lesser degree, though in a manner adequate as a component of their survival-niche requirements. For the purposes of this essay, those animals with their crude calls, limited displays and physical gesticulatory posturing will be ignored. Eliminativist philosophy rejects the existence of imaginary or chimerical phenomena like Pegasus or unicorns, or Meinongian crystal mountains beset with golden trees bearing luscious bespangled fruits. The eliminativist preoccupation is with identifying and discriminating between human symbolisation, both audible and visual, which correctly points to an actual object (denotatum) that once, historically, could be found in the world, or can contemporaneously be encountered as an actual object – and those which did not and do not satisfy these verificational conditions. Words which fail this requirement to indicate actual objects are abstractions. In philosophical usage the term ‘abstraction’ refers to the thought process of the human animal, whereby his or her ideas are distanced from certain objects in the world. In classical linguistics such non-denotational abstract words are graded as ‘designata,’ a designatory miscellanea which lacks the definitional stringency of ‘denotata’ and which usually refer to verbs describing actions, abstract or gerundial nouns, adverbials and adjectives used to describe the general existential modalities [properties] of entities rather than specific objects. Thus true nominata (real objects) indicated by the nouns: The girl, the cat, the mat, Julius Caesar, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Eiffel Tower etc. exist – or at one time existed, whilst linguistic codes which are bereft of nominata include adjectives used to describe or identify some human opinion in the form of an attribution about the nominatum. Thus such things as: ‘The girl’s beauty, the sitting of the cat on the mat, the death of Julius Caesar, the inauguration of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the ‘fact’ that the Eiffel Tower exists in Paris,’ do not exist. ‘Facts’ do not exist - only that which is factual (actual) exists.’ Until a new form of language develops with which to describe ideas beyond the terminologically encumbered realm of folk ontology, there is no other alternative than to write in natural language and to include regular semantic caveats. The abstraction used in this paper is only employed instrumentally in order that eliminativist ideas can be communicated, and the concept of the material imperium not be misconstrued as some deus absconditus [hidden god.] Personification in relation to insentient objects is employed where there is no linguistic alternative. In practice this means for example, that when I use the term ‘persistent’ or ‘perdurant’ to describe the existential modality of an insentient object [say a stone] I am not attributing a human ‘mental attitude’ or ‘volition’ ‘to the stone, (eliminativists reject both such concepts as existing anyway) nor am I assigning the capability of conscious choice and ‘intention’ to an entity bereft of the ability to think. The use of such abstraction does not mean I am guilty of crude personification, but is a simple recognition that as we lack any words in the human languages which adequately describe the existential ‘tendencies’ of insentient objects to perjure in the world, we must make do with the paucity of linguistic symbolisation available. In accordance with the age-old principles of nominalism, which act as a fundamental ground or rationale of most eliminativisms, abstraction is only acceptable in the realm of philosophical or ontological dialogue if it is employed in its correct syntactical role as helpful fiction facilitating an easier and less periphrastic explicatory, descriptive, exegetical or commentarial account of the world. In themselves such abstract terms do not exist, that is they are a feature of the existential modality of the utterer and the addressee. Neither do they instantiate, existentialise or represent by an instance any material entity that can be found in the world. Eliminativists have no agenda to remove any words from the English language. Eliminativists employ abstraction just like anybody else in daily life and see no reason not to take advantage of the useful fictions embedded in language in order to save time. The intention is to eliminate the use of ontologically clumsy terminology from the sphere of philosophical and scientific discourse, where abstraction, if used unthinkingly can cause problems of contextual definition with profound ontological implications. The intention is NOT to eliminate the words themselves from the lexicon, many of which are vitally important, culturally valuable and often aesthetically significant. A verb like ‘loving’ functions perfectly well as used in the conjugation of the continuous present in natural language, in that it can economically describe a mode of existence of an entity, as in the term: ‘The loving mother.’ But ‘loving’ as a gerund, creates the impression of having a specific referent that has modes of existence of its own. Thus: ‘The dancing girl, the rotten apple and the ragged flag’ are seen as being ontologically acceptable syntactically structured as they are to in such a way to make it semantically obvious that the existential modalities of the girl, the apple and the flag are introduced as being one of the manners or modes in which they are presently conceived as existing. One last example: ‘Fishing can provide a welcome addition to any larder.’ As against: ‘Fish can provide a welcome addition to any larder.’
We will now move on to a consideration of the holarchic super-systemic cosmos which I will introduce by way of a beautiful oriental metaphor.

Posted on Saturday, March 31st, 2007 at 1:45 pm
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