Heidegger

> rene:
>>> Jud, OD is indeed very odd. To be in-between beings and being is odd, but
>>> NOT being in between even much more so. The belief that one still has to do
>>> with beings or things or hours, while ‘being’ and ‘thing’ and ‘time’ are
>>> considered to be merely fictions, is so irrational
>
> mP:
>> sorry to but in, but: merely ‘considered’ to be “fictions”? By whom? And
>> does continuing to abide with/by beings, things, hours, necessarily involve
>> belief (in their existence)? This is surely the game of the LMatiste (one of
>> firm unshakeable belief-fired doctrine {or is it merely axiomatic this
>> belief in stuff [material objects, so-called]?}) and not that of others for
>> whom belief (and non-belief) is neither here nor there… (nor any where
>> else)
>
> rene:
>> Insight into the fictional character of metaphysical notions (in our era)
>> is therefore indispensable, and to just
>> claim overhistorical validity is nothing but one-eyed hybris in the face
>> of the massacres being performed with the
>> help of these same once venerable notions. I’d say, Jud is one step ahead
>> here, insofar the life form, handling the
>> notions, is posed into the foreground. This life form being Jud himself,
>> then reveals the consequences of blind
>> opposition to metaphysics, the dependence on which is tightened with every
>> objection. And from here to the reasons
>> for his slander, is a simple passage. To get stuck in an impossible
>> situation, is always the result of the incapacity
>> to deal with one’s widerwille. Opposing it, by recurrence to a merely
>> historical metaphysics, just tightens into an
>> even more hidden aversion. Just look where this has brought someone like
>> Anthony. So that in the end it does not
>> make any difference whether one knows the classics or not.

mP:
> Rene, you seem to me to be saying that the likes of Judist opposition to
> metaphysics is useful for thinkers (in this upside-down inside-out era)
> because of and in spite of his clearly blind ignorant arrogance towards and
> of that very metaphysics;

rene:
> The permanent ferociousness of the opposition, not the content.
> Recent Heidegger quote: The protest against philosophy contains more
philosophy than
> the ongoing play with ready-to-hand notions, which is merely despicable.

So if any someone with enough abject ferocity simply claims that all the
philosophers in the world are less than turds then the ferocity of
opposition itself by itself is worthy of philosophy (the ferocity has
veracity?) simply because of that fierce ferocity (as if from a soccer fan)?
Is that what Heidegger meant?

The masses despise (and perhaps have always despised) philosophy with a
ferocious passion, so what! Is that to be taken seriously?

mP:
> this barbarism then exposes not only the barbarism
> (of such idiocy) but also the false nature of those venerated notions of
> metaphysics itself?

rene:
> Heidegger: Metaphysics is essentially nihilism. As in the case of theology,
> the falsity of metaphysics/nihilism is all man-made.
> The nihil, Nothing *itself* is the veil of Being, the ‘essential’ Nothing.
> The lousy nothing (nichtige Nichts) is the result of man’s not being
> equal to it. But this not being able to cope is the mark of his finitude,
> and insofar ‘essential’. Hölderlin’s simple word of the necessity for the
test
> to go through the knee, gains the importance which it has, only within the
> sphere which is addressed here.
> So there ARE no: Being, Truth, Nothing etc. In our finite sphere they are
> essentially ambiguous, and also this sounds negative only to the one-sided.
> It is probably up to us, to decide, and never to *claim* one side. Rather,
> Heidegger proposes that the ambiguity/twofoldnes of od is to be led back
> to an original unity. There is no thoroughfare though when “the mortal
paths are
> despised” (Hölderlin). Without these, man is merely das Riesending, the
fantastic
> autocratic thing as which he presents himself. Metaphysics - and that
means:
> what is left of it - keeps man within the delusion that he is immortal,
that he
> disposes of the truth of beings.

So, the question of nihilism and the finitude of human being rests with the
business of mortality? Then (as Heidegger suggests in ‘Parmenides’) the
decisions as to truth, be-ing, nothing, etc, are decided only by those who
look through beings: the demonic, the divine, those whose look brings us
humans to our human essence?

mP:
> Thus a double whammy of barbaric falsity (both
> metaphysics and its blind ignorant opposition posing itself as philosophy
> {which at least journalism and stagnant mass opinion, etc, do not bother to
> glamorise themselves with}). Useful because both lots of falsity
> (metaphysics and its brutalised opposition {so-called; Jud’s ‘opposition’
> seems to me to be totally and obliviously caught up in the most obvious
> metaphysics}) are revealed, unconcealed? If so, and if truth is aletheia and
> aletheia is unconcealedness, then it seems you value truth too…?
> Opposition is futile yet opposition to opposition is not so…? You confuse
> me almost as much as Heidegger, and for that I thank you, but there’s a but
> I cannot yet articulate never mind validate.

rene:
> It can’t be done, nobody can. Therefore one needs help. But are we able and
willing
> to ask for and to receive help? Absolute subjectivism - now a global
phenomenon - ,
> with all its metaphysical and theological vocabulary, can’t.

Certainly, but the mortal (absolute subjectivism) paths may not be despised,
you & Holderlin say, so how to even ask for help… Are the gods watching
this?

rear guards

michaelP

> ‘gards

> michaelP
>
>> egards
>> rene

Posted on Thursday, October 11th, 2007 at 2:40 pm
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