Heidegger

— “Bakker, R.B.M. de” wrote:

> —–Oorspronkelijk bericht—–
> Van: heidegger-bounces at an-archos.com
> [mailto:heidegger-bounces@an-archos.com]Namens
> Anthony Crifasi
>
> Heidegger did more than merely “propose” that the
> ambiguity of the od is
> to be led back to an original unity. He showed how
> that very ambiguity
> **philosophically necessitates** transcending it.
>
> Sure, the necessity consisting in being swallowed
> by the raging of technology,
> and lose our essence of man. Not a danger, THE
> danger, regarding everyone, not
> just philosophers.

no not just that either:

“This distinction is grasped since Being and Time as
“ontological difference” - with the intention of
safeguarding the question of the truth of being from
all confusion. But this distinction is immediately
pushed in the direction from which it comes. For here
beingsness is claimed as ousia, idea; and following
these, the objectness is claimed as condition for the
possibility of the object. Therefore, in attempting to
overcome the first effort at the question of being in
Being and Time and its emanations, varying attempts
were needed to master the “ontological difference,” to
grasp its very origin and that means its genuine
onefold. Therefore, the effort was needed to come free
of the “condition for the possibility” as going back
into the merely “mathematical” and to grasp the truth
of being from within its own essential sway
(enowning). Hence the tormenting and discording
character of this distinction. For as necessary as
this distinction is (to think in traditional terms),
in order to provide at all a preliminary perspective
for the question of being, just as disastrous does
this distinction continue to be. For this distinction
indeed does arise from a questioning of beings as such
(of beingness). But in this way one never arrives
directly at the question of being. In other words,
this distinction itself becomes the real barrier which
misplaces the inquiry into the question of being,
insofar as, by presupposing this distinction, one
attempts to go further than this distinction and to
inquire into its onefold. This onefold can never be
anything but the mirroring of the distinction and can
never lead to the origin, in view of which this
distinction can no longer be seen as originary.
Therefore the task is not to surpass beings
(transcendence) but rather to leap over this
distinction and thus over transcendence and to inquire
inceptually into being and truth.” (Contributions,
B150)

Heidegger’s case against the od is therefore eminently
philosophical, not merely an appeal to the danger of
technology. The attempt to “grasp the truth of being
from within its own essential sway” cannot succeed
through the od precisely because that path inquires
only into an originary onefold “behind” the
distinction, which onefold is therefore merely
determined and conditioned by the distinction itself.
The distinction is therefore, by that methodology,
never really overcome.

That’s philosophy, Rene.

> Without ’smelling’, that is: dealing with
> nihilism as diagnosed by Nietszche,
> there is no way out. Heidegger speaks in decisive
> contexts - at this moment volumes
> are appearing with late notes and texts - of the
> necessity to drop knowing, and to
> open up for … guessing (raten). First,
> metaphysics and what Heidegger proposed as new
> thinking are to be set apart. Only when this
> succeeds, is it possible to leave metaphysics
> to itself, as is said it must be near the end of
> Time and Being. Otherwise the hedgehog of
> od will stand ready everywhere.
> Heidegger is heavily criticising himself, so if
> one thinks one can do without that, and simply
> know it all better, one also can be left to
> oneself.

I’m not advocating doing without that part of
Heidegger. I’m saying that the way he does it is not
the way you do it, as evidenced above. His criticism
of himself is philosophical. Yours …?

Posted on Thursday, October 11th, 2007 at 6:10 pm
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