Heidegger

—–Oorspronkelijk bericht—–
Van: heidegger-bounces at an-archos.com [mailto:heidegger-bounces@an-archos.com]Namens Anthony Crifasi
Verzonden: maandag 29 oktober 2007 18:41
Aan: Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
Onderwerp: Re: The Oddness of the OD

On 10/29/07, Bakker, R.B.M. de wrote:

The conclusion of the discussion of Aristotle’s distinction physis-techne, was that the sense of being
attributed to physis: being-of-itself, is to be thought completely anew in an era of unlimited techne.

Unlimited technology - which, rather than machinery, is a one-sided way of thinking - functions such
that it is not able/willing to allow any other meaning of being than which it knows, ‘is’ itself. Also in
discussions about Aristotle, Descartes, Heidegger. That in the Greek sphere things are said to disclose
themselves (apophainesthai), is explained as if they are performing an action, the kind of action which,
since Descartes, is claimed by the subject. But this cannot be the case, for the simple reason, that before
Descartes, without Descartes, the subject has not yet discovered itself, ‘is’ not yet. Remaining on this
simple level - which is very much advisable - , the conclusion would be, that before Descartes nothing
was. But also the nothing is not accepted by technological thinking.

So one better starts again all over, with Aristotle’s physis as the way-of-being of everything which has
the arche of its being in itself. A tree is of itself. A tree appears of itself.

Rene, I still need to get back to your last post in reply to me (I’ve been swamped lately)

You moved to New Orleans?

about comparing Gestell and the OD, but regarding this post, the controversy between Descartes and Aristotle is much more nuanced. Descartes questioned the entire notion of physis by showing that the very principles of mechanical techne (a field explicitly delineated and accepted by Aristotle) could be equally applied to the realm of beings that Aristotle thought was distinctly non-mechanical - i.e., the realm of physis. Hence, by the very same principle of efficiency that was explicitly accepted by Aristotle in the Physics, there would be no philosophical need for his distinction between things that exist by physis (as having the arche of its being in itself) and things that exist by techne. So one cannot simply “start again all over with Aristotle’s physis” and simply pass over the Cartesian point here, since it is undeniable that what Aristotle himself described as mechanics does indeed encompass much more of beings than he thought. In this, Descartes was right.

Descartes was right in that he found the new fundamentum, upon which *everything* could be founded. His is the idea of a mathesis *universalis*, the
actual elaboration has been done by others: Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, after which modern metaphysics was ‘ready’.

That a return to Aristotle is impossible, has everything to do with the cogent shift made by Descartes. Cogent also in the sense, that all theology and
philosophy, but not only they, change in the new light seen by Descartes. What is to be seen by us, is that this new light is such, that it has to be
claimed and grounded as self-evident, and cannot therefore, in punishment of insecurity, be accepted as a light which shines of itself. We now are standing
at the very end of the ego cogito, which Heidegger calls thoughtlessness. To start up thinking again, what is needed is to overcome the Cartesian turning,
that is: modern, subjectivist, metaphysics. BUT IN ORDER TO DO SO, it is necessary to go further back, because the change of truth happening by
Descartes implies a radical change of the basic metaphysical notions delivered to him. Instead of still quibbling whether Descartes really doubted enough,
what is at stake underneath, is the *perspective* of certitude itself, by which all Descartes critics is steered in advance. In order to get into view the claim of
certitude, it is necessary to trace back the rising of the need of a fundamentum inconcussum. To be short, Heidegger found that this is brought about by
metaphysical thought itself, as it has presented itself since Plato and Aristotle. Beings-as-a-whole is only representable as resting on a ground, which is
to be laid, and this is true of all metaphysics. Heidegger calls this metaphysical trait: subjectity, distinguishing it from subjectivism, which is its modern
variant, where, in a reflexive medium, it encounters itself. Seen thus, Descartes and Aristotle are metaphysically ‘the same’. This leads to the question
of the Geschick of western, now global metaphysics. And it is high time to ask for it, because everyone on the planet now feels its urge. Esp. the relation
of Greek art-religion and Jew-born Christendom is to be asked for, after which the other beginnings should be brought in too. But the spoiled race moves
in the legacy of Descartes: autism as thoughtless subjectivity (which is really no subjectivism anymore, but subjectity/Gestell. A solution only gets into
sight when things are gone to the ground, so that metaphysical ground and no-longer-metaphysical abground are held apart. What is metaphysics?:
metaphysics feeds from a ground (Descartes’ tree), but it does not, as such, turn to the bottom, the element it is in, itself.

Heidegger was essentially helped on his way by Hölderlin, who, in his time, was leading in philosophy, but was pulled away from it. As we know, he
grew up in Christian spheres, then turned all his attention and hopes to the Greeks, but near the end discovered that the absence of Christ was a warning
signal. (Patmos, Der Einzige). Lately i am thinking that not Heidegger is the issue, but Hölderlin.

rene

Posted on Tuesday, October 30th, 2007 at 2:45 pm
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