The Oddness of the OD*
October 30th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: The Oddness of the OD :: The Oddness of the OD :: The Oddness of the OD :: The Oddness of the OD
—–Oorspronkelijk bericht—–
Van: heidegger-bounces at an-archos.com [mailto:heidegger-bounces@an-archos.com]Namens Bernx at aol.com
Verzonden: maandag 29 oktober 2007 23:41
Aan: heidegger at an-archos.com
CC: Bernx at aol.com; gbovasso850 at comcast.net
Onderwerp: Re: The Oddness of the OD*
In a message dated 10/29/2007 10:21:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, R.B.M.deBakker at uva.nl writes:
…..before Descartes, without Descartes, the subject has not yet discovered itself, ‘is’ not yet. Remaining on this
simple level - which is very much advisable - , the conclusion would be, that before Descartes nothing
was. But also the nothing is not accepted by technological thinking.
So one better starts again all over, with Aristotle’s physis as the way-of-being of everything which has
the arche of its being in itself. A tree is of itself. A tree appears of itself.
Yes, of course, Rene, but the in itselfness posed here detaches the entelechal nature of the tree from Aristotle’s prima materia and which is not the arche of the tree but of its vas of containment as protohyle from which “tree” as being out there (in the world) has been winnowed out (apocrisis) and which is not much different from the notion of dasein. So right from the start and without a lingusitic
is-ness being is revealed in its arche state as protohyle: as a that which is without any evidence of an object nature. Only after the tree, or any object phenomenon comes into appearance (morphe) is the in- its-selfness ascertained. In this sense the arche of the tree is conditioned in being by that of the protohylic arche that in itself cannot be phenomonen or shown in appearance. But without this “invisible,” irrepresentable and formless Being it is not possible to think of all that may daseinically come into being in the world of appearence. The protohylic matrix thus prevails being in appearance as a *facultus praeformandi.* Accordingly, isness is before it is as the silent cogito for for all that be-comes as morphe, appearance and phainomenon. Descartes is saying as much for the isness that is “I am” and by which *cogito* serves as the dynamis qua energia of the Aristotelian entelechy. As a result “I am” arrives covalent with the ability to Think (cogito).
sincerely;
Bernard
Bernard,
But ability to think is not enough for Descartes’ fundamentum to actually stand. Only by actual thinking, actually bringing myself
before myself, is the ‘cogito sum’ established. And that is also what Descartes is saying in the Meditations. Leibniz then brings
more clarity, by attributing to the substantial monad representation and appetite in their mutual dependence.
Joining you on the way back now to Aristotle, something similar can indeed be viewed: physis as subsistent hyle, remaining the same
in all transformation, is adhered to by Antiphon among many others. Discussing Antiphon in Physics B, Aristotle first agrees that hyle
is physis, but then, in a surprising way, turns this position upside down, and calls morphe physis in the real sense. And indeed, if one
realizes that physis means rising/Aufgehen, one must admit that there is not much rising in Antiphon’s hyle, and therefore also not
much completion/entelecheia. I have tried to show in earlier posts how Aristotle tends to understand hyle from dynamis, where dynamis is not merely material or even logical possibility, but adequateness for morphe. More in Heidegger’s Vom Wesen und Begriff der physis.
regards
rene
In a message dated 10/29/2007 10:21:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, R.B.M.deBakker at uva.nl writes:
The conclusion of the discussion of Aristotle’s distinction physis-techne, was that the sense of being
attributed to physis: being-of-itself, is to be thought completely anew in an era of unlimited techne.
Unlimited technology - which, rather than machinery, is a one-sided way of thinking - functions such
that it is not able/willing to allow any other meaning of being than which it knows, ‘is’ itself. Also in
discussions about Aristotle, Descartes, Heidegger. That in the Greek sphere things are said to disclose
themselves (apophainesthai), is explained as if they are performing an action, the kind of action which,
since Descartes, is claimed by the subject. But this cannot be the case, for the simple reason, that before
Descartes, without Descartes, the subject has not yet discovered itself, ‘is’ not yet. Remaining on this
simple level - which is very much advisable - , the conclusion would be, that before Descartes nothing
was. But also the nothing is not accepted by technological thinking.
So one better starts again all over, with Aristotle’s physis as the way-of-being of everything which has
the arche of its being in itself. A tree is of itself. A tree appears of itself.
rene
