Heidegger

17/09/2008 _jPolanik at nc.rr.com_ (mailto:jPolanik@nc.rr.com) writes:

Interpretation of Symbolic Forms

Jud Wrote:
You insist on an appeal to authority? - Try this one for size!

Professor. Suber:
*Which quantifier? In deciding between quantifiers, ask yourself whether the
English sentence commits itself to the existence of something or whether it
remains non-committal. In the former case, use an existential quantifier; in
the latter, use a universal quantifier.* *Translation Tips:* Prof. Peter
Suber, Philosophy Department, Earlham College./
_http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/log/transtip.htm_
 http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/l…)

Joe:
the existential quantifier asserts the existence of something; but, does
not assume your definition of existence.

Jud:
Nor does the EQ assert your definition of *existence* (or the definition
that you include as a viable alternative to the materialist definition.) This
clash of definitions can easily be resolved. I will produce an example of my
version or tell you where you may view one (say *The Statue of Liberty* and
you produce a single example of your will O’ the wisp existential say:
*liberty.* We can compare them for visibility, light reflectance, solidity, size,
texture, temperature, age, composition, colour, the sound they produce when
tapped with a toffee hammer etc. While you are at it throw in a number (any one
you like for good measure. )

Hmmm… Yes, when you produce your transcendentalist entity we can perhaps
measure it as well… I have always been curious as to the length, breadth
and depth of *Liberty.*

Your admission that there are various interpretations of the existential
quantifier merely reinforces my claim that it is useless for any serious
ontological expression or comments. All it does (on the basis of your trannie
interpretation of its import) is to lay out nonsense in another way from that of
the natural language version of the onto- fantasy. There are no doubt other
symbols which are ontologically obfuscational which I will be confronted with,
but the way I see it now it has no application or use for philosophy, for
all it does is to present the same ontological controversies in another format.

As Jon rightly suggests, in his own form of words - logical notation is not
actually meant to cope with ontological definitions. It leaves me surprised
that the great men who created these systems did not think of this problem
and provide ways (not of resolving such controversy) but at least supplying
alternative versions that enables users to make it clear (by their choice of
existentialiser) where they stand and what version of *reality* the expression
is addressing. HOWEVER, in the same way that one can only combat Nazi turds
like Heidegger, or see through biblical lies, is by reading B & T or the
bible, I suppose I will have to plow through these symbols and re-examine and
analyse the rest of the symbolisation and identify the formulaic flaws that it
shares with natural language.

Having said all that, and forgetting about the Descartes crap and your
quixotic quest to discover what you are, maybe you are on to something after all
with your scheme to award different symbols to create a new set of
existentialisers? In that sense could you outline your scheme very basically again so
we can have another look - you never know someone amongst us might even be
able to suggest improvements.

Joe:
if you read the rest of Suber’s website; you’ll find the following passages:
[Note: ‘E’ substituted for the backwards -E symbol in these quotes from
_http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/log/terms3.htm_
 http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/l…) ]

If we want to assert a predicate of some objects (at least one), we use the
existential quantifier, “(Ex)”. For example, “(Ex)Mx” says that, for some (at
least one) x, x is mortal; or idiomatically, something is mortal.

Jud:
In that mortality (death) is strictly confined to a class of objects which
are organic, humans, cats, birds, insects, trees and plants, bacteria, etc., we
see here that the existential quantifier is stringently circumscribing its
operation to that of living, material objects. Obviously if the formulation
expresses the claim: “(Ex)Mx” and the X stands for *liberty* it is a nonsense
expression. In other words an entity of that type has to exist in order to
die. Therefore any transcendental object, the soul for example, cannot exist or
suffer mortality because according to trannies it does not die but lives on
after the death of its host. If the response is the soul is a living entity,
but is not a member of the class which is mortal - then it is up to the
trannie brigade to prove it.

Joe:
Quantifiers refer to the universe of discourse, the background set of things
we are talking about.

Jud: So what - so do natural language expressions like *exist* and *is* etc?

Joe: By default, the universe of discourse contains everything whatsoever
that can be referred to.

Jud: So does natural language, but in far more detail and with the ability
to cope with far more subtle references and description.

Joe: This includes things that don’t exist, like centaurs and square
circles, since we sometimes want to talk about them.

Jud: So does natural language but in far more detail and with the ability to
cope with far more subtle references and description.

Joe: When we stipulate that the universe of discourse is some smaller set of
things, e. g. the set of all human beings, then the quantifiers refer only to
that set of things. For example, “(x)Mx” would then assert that all human
beings are mortal, and “(Ex)Mx” would assert that at least one human being is
mortal.

Jud: Yes, I have already referred to that above.

By convention, the existential quantifier has existential import; that is,
it asserts the existence of something. “(Ex)Mx” asserts the existence of
something mortal. The universal quantifier lacks existential import; it is
non-committal. So “(x)(Ax Bx)” asserts that all A’s —if any— are B’s; it does not
presuppose that any A’s exist. These conventions are modern, due to George
Boole. Aristotle held that both forms of quantification possess existential
import.

Joe: focus, Jud. the issues in controversy are your claims that, for
purposes of translating the existential quantifier,

1: ‘there exists’ means something other than ‘there is at least one’.

Jud:
I have no quarrel with the expression: *there is at least one,* for it is
completely unrestrictive and would not nullify a descriptive statement which
comments on the cows in the field opposite my home and says… *There is at
least one cow in the field,* when in fact there are nineteen. In that sense for
item 1 there is no *controversy,* for I do not restrict my existential claims
either to one (cow) or nineteen cows. For me the numerical system and the
numbers it contains do not exist - they are a useful fiction - what exists are
the cows and I/me looking at them.

2: ‘there exists’ means ‘there exists as a physical object’

Jud: I accept that there is a certain class of humans who exist as claimants
that ‘there exist nonphysical objects. They exist - but the objects they
claim exist do not. In my case BOTH I (as an object) and the objects which
surround exist.

Joe:
you still need to back up these claims.

Jud:
I am not making any claims whatsoever - it is YOU who is making the claims
that there are other invisible entities present in the world

PRODUCE THEM!

Jud

Posted on Sunday, September 21st, 2008 at 6:00 am
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback