The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes
March 15th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>is there any possible way for the construction of the human to be
>>dependent on having the correct understanding of philosophical
>>prioritizations?
>>would you at least agree that the structure of a human is what it is
>>irregardless of differences of race, ethnic affiliation, gender or
>>opinions about philosophical prioritizations?
>Again, the fact that you think that the question of “the structure of a
>human” could be independent of the question of “philosophical
>prioritizations” indicates serious fundamental misunderstandings of the
>philosophical issues involved.
Hmmm. I notice you didn’t actually answer the question. would you not
agree that what separates philosophy from ideology is just this
principle: that the structure of a human, whatever that structure is, is
the same for all humans?
>For that reason, let’s *exclusively* concentrate on the side of the
>argument that I think motivated Heidegger to come with his
>philosophical reprioritization in the first place - namely, the
>internal self-destruction of your line of analysis of human being. You
>can’t critique Heidegger’s notion of Dasein (and it can be critiqued)
>until you understand it, and you clearly don’t yet.
>By the way, I don’t think that’s really your fault, first because
>Heidegger’s phenomenology begins with what is philosophically
>counterintuitive to us - namely, the philosophical analysis of our
>PRE-analytical ways of encountering beings, without imposing analytical
>categories. It takes a long time for a mind trained in traditional
>analytical philosophy to learn to do that - even Husserl ended up
>imposing analytical categories on our pre-analytical encounters when he
>tried it. Secondly, Heidegger scholars are notoriously bad at
>explaining his philosophy clearly, partly due to the aforementioned
>counterintuitive aspect of his starting point.
>So let’s leave Heidegger aside for the moment and concentrate on why I
>think your line of questioning would lead straight to either the
>destruction of the self (Hume) or the reduction of Others into the self
>(Husserl). This WILL inevitably lead to why Heidegger says what he
>says.
I don’t mind hearing you explain how I can cause this philosophical
catastrophe simply by asking ‘what am I?’. I am willing to play along;
but, I have some reservations that I probably should mention:
1. Heidegger attributes a first-person perspective to dasein and
illustrates its use by having dasein utter ‘I am’ — the same statement
Descartes says is necessarily true. I don’t think we’re going to be able
to discuss the ultimate philosophical catastrophe, sinking into the
quagmire of SIS, without wondering how this statement, ‘I am’, is true
when dasein says it; but, false when Descartes says it.
2. you have created a minor philosophical catastrophe of your own during
the Hume’s brain thought experiment, discussion of which ended abruptly.
you abandoned your argument without providing a rational defense of your
claim that, after Igor cracks open Hume’s skull, you see a brain of
reality type 1 whereas I see a brain of reality type 2.
unless you have revised your views concerning the Hume’s brain paradox,
I suggest you start there; but, it’s your call. you may start wherever
you like.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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