The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes
March 15th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> >>is there any possible way for the construction of the human to be
> >>dependent on having the correct understanding of philosophical
> >>prioritizations?
>
> >>would you at least agree that the structure of a human is what it is
> >>irregardless of differences of race, ethnic affiliation, gender or
> >>opinions about philosophical prioritizations?
>
> >Again, the fact that you think that the question of “the structure of a
> >human” could be independent of the question of “philosophical
> >prioritizations” indicates serious fundamental misunderstandings of the
> >philosophical issues involved.
>
> Hmmm. I notice you didn’t actually answer the question. would you not
> agree that what separates philosophy from ideology is just this
> principle: that the structure of a human, whatever that structure is, is
> the same for all humans?
Not the structure of “a human,” but rather the structure of “human
being.” The difference is that the former is an individual, while the
latter is a much more philosophically flexible way of putting it. I am
“a human.” But “human being” is less limiting.
> >So let’s leave Heidegger aside for the moment and concentrate on why I
> >think your line of questioning would lead straight to either the
> >destruction of the self (Hume) or the reduction of Others into the self
> >(Husserl). This WILL inevitably lead to why Heidegger says what he
> >says.
>
> I don’t mind hearing you explain how I can cause this philosophical
> catastrophe simply by asking ‘what am I?’. I am willing to play along;
> but, I have some reservations that I probably should mention:
>
> 1. Heidegger attributes a first-person perspective to dasein and
> illustrates its use by having dasein utter ‘I am’ — the same statement
> Descartes says is necessarily true. I don’t think we’re going to be able
> to discuss the ultimate philosophical catastrophe, sinking into the
> quagmire of SIS, without wondering how this statement, ‘I am’, is true
> when dasein says it; but, false when Descartes says it.
When Descartes or you say it, what is meant (as you yourself said) is
either a mind or a soul or a spirit or neurons. That’s the problem - the
manner in which you’ve casted the problem already presupposes the
prioritization of me over Them. That list of choices already discounts
from the start the possibility that “I” am really fundamentally Them.
> 2. you have created a minor philosophical catastrophe of your own during
> the Hume’s brain thought experiment, discussion of which ended abruptly.
> you abandoned your argument without providing a rational defense of your
> claim that, after Igor cracks open Hume’s skull, you see a brain of
> reality type 1 whereas I see a brain of reality type 2.
We both see a phenomenal reality - me no more than you. We all have to
use our senses to see the brain. There’s no difference in reality type.
