Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>So all you are claiming to actually prove is that self-existence is a
>phenomenal reality …

I think I’ve proved a bit more than this.

after proving that the I-2, this phenomenological experiencer is real,
I-2 conclude that I-2 am not self-instantiating (ie self-creating,
self-causing or self-originating). first there is no evidence of this;
and, secondly, there is not even a coherent explanation of how I-2,
somthing whose only know ‘ability’ is the ability to experience, could
be self-instantiating.

the conclusion seems inescapable: I-2 am a phenomenon that is produced
or generated by some other reality or realities — by one or more
meta-phenomenal realities of type 1 and/or type 3. there are at least
these possibilities: the I-2 is generated solely by the brain or some
portion thereof (the I-1); or, solely by an immaterial component of the
human individual such as an immaterial mind, soul or self (the I-3); or,
by the interaction of both.

there is also one fact that I accept as proven by others.

I-2 accept as proven that I-2 have a physical body — that this
experience I-2 have of seeming to have a body is due to actually having
a body. I-2 have not proven this by deductive means as Descartes tried
to do. I accept this as a matter of scientific investigation. there is
overwhelming evidence that I-2 have a physical body made out of the same
’stuff’ that the physical universe is made of; and, I-2 accept it as
proven beyond a plausible doubt.

there is, however, no basis for saying that the reality of the I-3 is
established by empirical evidence; and, thus, if one wishes to
investigate the origin of the I-2, one must first pose the question of
being: is there an I-3?

>but in that case, how would it be any more real than a dream (which is
>also a phenomenal reality)? Descartes obviously thinks he is proving
>more than a mere phenomenal reality; otherwise, he wouldn’t have said
>that the cogito escapes the dream objection in the first meditation.

the dream objection is only a basis for doubting phenomenal realities
that are *experienced* realities. Descartes is meditating while sitting
by the fire in a winter dressing gown; and, at first is certain that he
is doing so; but, then realizes that he has been convinced of just such
facts in dreams. he has a reason to doubt that he is sitting in a chair
wearing a dressing gown; but, no reason to doubt that the *experiencing*
subject is unreal.

as soon as the phenomenological experiencer notices ‘I-2 am dreaming’
the I-2 may reason as it does while awake (or it may so reason after its
body awakens): I-2 am the referent of ‘I-2′ whenever I-2 say “I-2 am
dreaming”; hence, I-2 am self-aware; hence, I-2 am real.

here is a portion of a post to the MoFPP (Meditations on First Person
Philosophy) list at google groups.

consider the possibility that Descartes had such an experience. His own
dream diary has been lost; but, his biographer, Bailot, relates the
content of the three dreams from Descartes’ three-dream night. The third
was what we now call a lucid dream. that term was not available in
Descartes’ era; so, it is likely he considered it some form of mystical
experience.

even if Descartes considered the third dream to be ‘just’ a dream, the
presence of reflective self-awareness in the midst of illusion would
have given it unusual significance; and, that sense of significance
would have a problem. he was living during the time of the unholy
inquisition; and, contemporary church opinion held that dreams we sent
to people by the Adversay, the Deceiver, Satan or one of his minions.

since we know that Descartes had kept a dream diary for many years,
one might reasonably suppose that Descartes wondered whether the third
had any validity. he might have decided that the Deceiver was trying
to deceive him about everything possible; and, certainly succeeding in
convincing Descartes that he was standing up, moving around, seeing a
book on a table, etc., when he was really asleep in bed.

Descartes might have realized that the Deceiver could never trick
Descartes into thinking ‘I am’ when the truth could better be
expressed as ‘I am not’.

does this remind you of a certain passage from Descartes’ second
meditation? Today, we often think that this encounter with the
malicious demon of supreme cunning an power is nothing but a literary
device to lend credence to Descartes’ excessive doubt. but, if he had
in mind his lucid dream (or mystical transport or whatever he called
it), he might have realized that all of it might well have been an
illusion — except for his own self-awareness: ‘Si fallor, sum!’.

not only does Descartes believe that the cogito (or as I put it, the
experientio) survive the dream objection, it is a plausible (though
unproven) speculation that Descartes discovered the certainty of the
cogito by experiencing reflective self-awareness in a lucid dream and
pondering the implications of that when he later awakened.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, November 25th, 2007 at 12:57 pm
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