The Relationship between Axiom and Translation
November 25th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Yes, I Have No Holerons :: Axiom 0 and its Translation (1) :: Is Dasein a Reality?
Cologne 25-Nov-2007
Joseph Polanik schrieb Sat, 24 Nov 2007 08:44:35 -0500:
> Axiom 0: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation
>
> >>JP: I do not deny that this originary phenomenon is ontologically prior
> to
> >>the language used to describe it. I am, however, saying that the
> >>language used to describe this originary phenomenon as ‘being itself’
> >>depends on the choice of ‘being’ as the root predicate.
>
> >ME: So we agree that the originary phenomenon is prior to any
> >predications, …
>
> JP: we agree as to this portion of your statement; but, not as to your
> continuation:
>
> >ME:… so that the term “root predicate” is insofar uprooted and
> >derivative of the originary phenomenon.
>
> JP: the term ‘root predicate’ is not ‘uprooted’ because it is not
> derivative
> of the originary phenomenon. it derives from the language used to say
> something about something (whether the orginary phenomenon or something
> else).
ME: If the originary phenomenon is ontologically prior to predicate logic,
then predicate logic is ontologically derivative of the originary phenomenon.
So one first has to have the originary phenomenon in view.
>
> >ME: This originary phenomenon can have many names,
>
> JP: true enough; but, this originary phenomenon does not tell you its own
> name.
ME: Nobody said it did.
>
> JP: the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget spent a lifetime
> investigating the evolution of a world view in children. in _The Child’s
> Conception of the World_, Piaget writes about the child’s view of the
> relationship between the name and the thing named.
>
> “… in the primitive stage [5-6], the name of the thing is a part of
> the thing … it is a part of the essence of a thing.” [p.75]
>
> in the next stage children say that the name is ‘nowhere’ or is ‘in the
> air’; but, it is not yet in the mind of the speaker. the name might be
> in the voice of the speaker. in the third stage. the child understands
> that the name of a thing comes from within us.
>
> “the third stage on the contrary is characterised by this discovery that
> names are in ourselves and come from within us. the child asserts
> outright that they are ‘in the head’. this stage occurs at the age of 9
> or 10.” [p. 77]
>
> phenomenological inquiry needs to assume an adult view of the relation
> between names and the things named: no phenomenon, not even the
> originary phenomenon, tells us its own name; and, hence, the name we
> give it does not derive from it. the name for it comes from the language
> we use to name it.
ME: We are presumably not doing developmental psychology here, nor what you
term psychophilosophical inquiry. At least I’m not.
>
> >ME: If you want to proceed “in the same way” as mathematical physics,
> >then do so. But I prefer to do philosophical ontology, and you yourself
> >claim you are undertaking a phenomenological inquiry. Such an inquiry
> >cannot get off the ground if it starts by unquestioningly assuming an
> >axiomatic method borrowed from mathematics.
>
> JP: the phenomenological inquiry is certainly one method of conducting a
> psychophilosophical inquiry; and, it is the method I use; but, the
> results of such an inquiry can not be reported except thru the use of
> language (and, I believe, some might say could not be conducted by
> someone who had no language).
>
> the axiomatic method borrowed from mathematics is intended to affect the
> language used to report the results of phenomenological inquiry; but,
> since language use is itself a phenomenon worthy of clarification, the
> relation between the axiomatic language and the phenomenological inquiry
> is inherently reflexive.
>
> >>>ME: You seem to think that the content is independent of language. It
> >>>is not. You have to try to say what you have to say in a particular
> >>>language, listening all the while to what that language says to you.
> >>>Note also that English ‘being’ has an Indo-European root ‘*bhu’, so
> >>>equivalents can be found in all Indo-European languages. But the
> >>>important point is that your very thinking is linguistically and
> >>>historically situated and bound.
>
> >>JP: this last, claim together with the extensive etymological
> information
> >>you have presented in previous posts, suggests that you have forgotten
> >>something significant concerning the relationship between an axiomatic
> >>system and its verbal translation (or interpretation or model): it is
> >>the axiomatic system that controls the meaning of the verbal
> >>translation.
>
> >>you seem to want it the other way around.
>
> >ME: Yes, I do. Axiomatic systems in philosophy (cf. Spinoza’s) are
> >invariably based on a misguided emulation of ostensibly rigorous
> >mathematical method which unfortunately (for the striving for total
> >calculability) runs off the rails in philosophical terrain..
>
> JP: clearly, Spinoza took the axiomatic method to an extreme; but,
> precisely
> where did he go astray?
>
> equally clearly, it is possible to go too far toward the opposite
> extreme by completely denying that there can be an axiomatic foundation
> for the language in which philosophy is conducted or expressed —
> especially since you’ve acknowledged that certain of the axioms that I
> have proposed (0, 1, and 2) are actually true.
ME: I have said nothing so far about your Axioms 1 and 2.
The classical example of an axiomatic approach in mathematics is Euclidian
geometry, and there, the axioms are accepted because there is an immediate
geometric intuition (an Anschauung or visualization) for what the axiom
postulates.
There is nothing at all clear and self-evident, however, about the
applicability of an axiomatic foundation for ontology. Your Axiom 0, for
instance, states that there is something to be said that can be said about
each and every x that is, i.e. about each and every being. But it is
precisely the task of ontology to delve into what “x is” means, i.e. to
elucidate the sense of being rather than surreptitiously presupposing it.
The “x is” assumed by Axiom 0 is already the fundamental _logos_: “is” is
said of “x”.
>
> JP: I prefer to take a middle path: to identify the point at which
> psychopilosophers have gone astray by clarifying the relationship
> between the meaning of the root predicate as limited by the axiomatic
> foundation and the meaning of the root predicate as it is used within an
> actual philsophical system.
>
> in your case for example, you seem to insist that ‘being’ must be used
> as a root predicate; and, you seem to be saying things about being that
> can not be derived from Axiom 0. so the question naturally arises: what
> is the basis for such claims? I suspect that your reply would reference
> your experience of the originary phenomenon you named ‘being’.
>
> the problematic claim is your insistence that every statement made about
> being-[the originary phenomenon] is attributable to whatever is a
> being-[the root predicate].
>
ME: I certainly do not insist “that every statement made about being-[the
originary phenomenon] is attributable to whatever is a being-[the root
predicate]”.
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