Heidegger

On 11/26/07, Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >Since all human “evidence” and “explanation” is derived from sense
> >experience, which is obviously phenomenal, then I-2 has *never* had any
> >evidence or experience of *anything* being instantiated by I-1 or I-3,
> >much less I-2 itself.
>
> this is a very much under appreciated insight into the value of Hume’s
> experiential effort to detect his own Self by means of introspection. he
> noted various perceptions but did not ’see’ his Self. his argument is
> usually taken to mean that if he did not detect the I-3 (Self) then
> there is no I-3. most people fail to realize that he did not perceive
> his own brain (I-1) either.

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That’s why I added below that one *in principle cannot* detect anything of
your type 3, since any form of human detection will be by definition
phenomenal (whether a mental or sensory phenomenon), and therefore of type
2. Type 3 realities are therefore undetectable *in principle* and not merely
in practice. The brain, on the other hand, can be detected simply by
cracking open the skull and holding up a mirror.
=============

>In other words, experience is by definition phenomenal, so it is not
>an argument to say “there is no evidence” or “explanation” of I-2 being
>self-instantiating, since there neither is *nor can possibly be*
>evidence to the contrary. This is Hume’s argument.

which of Hume’s arguments are you referring to?

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Several, but here’s one:

“We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is
besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with
the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external
objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate,
to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive. Now
since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions … it follows
that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any
thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our
attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination
to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but
those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.” (Treatise of
Human Nature, very end of Part II)
==============

also, can you explain how you can define ‘evidence’ and ‘explanation’ as
phenomenal (because derived from sense experience) without created an
impasse in which there is no evidence either for or against the
claim that the I-2 is not self-instantiating?

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It’s not merely that evidence for type 3 reality is lacking; rather, it’s
that it’s an inherently *inconceivable* idea, since any claim to such a
conception would be, as conceived, phenomenal by definition (whether mental
or sensory). So the idea that I-2 is instantiated by a type 3 reality is
utterly inconceivable.
==============

I find it difficult to accept the claim that there can be no
’scientific’ evidence about the ‘physical universe’ because of a
philosopher’s opinion about the evidentiary value of experience
including empirical experiments.

==============
My argument isn’t merely from my opinion, but from the distinctions *you*
made between types 1,2, and 3 realities in your attempt to prove that I
Exist.
==============

if there were no evidence concering the physical universe, how would a
philosopher decide either that there is fossil record indicating that
life on earth evolved over billions of years; or, that the earth popped
into awareness 5 milliseconds ago complete with an illusionary fossil
record and a set of false memories for each person?

==============
If you distinguish types 1,2, and 3 realities, then there would indeed be no
way to decide the above, as Hume showed. That’s why philosophers since Hume
reconsidered making such distinctions.
==============

>>there is, however, no basis for saying that the reality of the I-3 is
>>established by empirical evidence; and, thus, if one wishes to
>>investigate the origin of the I-2, one must first pose the question of
>>being: is there an I-3?

>But you just said above that the reality of I-3 is established by
>empirical evidence beyond a shadow of a doubt - you said that
>”scientific investigation” yields “evidence” that there is a “physical
>universe” beyond a shadow of a doubt.

I said that I accept as proven that the human body is made of the same
’stuff’ as the rest of the physical universe. that’s reality type 1,
existential. reality type 3, ontological reality, is any non-physical
metaphenomenal reality. that there are any realities of type 3 is very
much in dispute. that is why I posed the question of being as: is there
an I-3?

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Hume’s objections work for types 1 or 3, since if type 2 includes all that
is phenomenal, then by definition, any type 1 reality is utterly
inconceivable.
=============

Posted on Tuesday, November 27th, 2007 at 6:35 pm
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