Heidegger

Axiom 0: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation

Michael Eldred wrote:

>Joseph Polanik schrieb

>>Michael Eldred wrote:

>>>ME: I have shown that questioning the presuppositions you have
>>>supposed in your CPI leads back to what is posited ontologically
>>>beforehand, namely, the phenomenon (not the “chosen” “root
>>>predicate”) of being itself, i.e. pure, unmediated, indeterminate
>>>presence.

>>I do not deny that this originary phenomenon is ontologically prior to
>>the language used to describe it. I am, however, saying that the
>>language used to describe this originary phenomenon as ‘being itself’
>>depends on the choice of ‘being’ as the root predicate.

>ME: So we agree that the originary phenomenon is prior to any
>predications, …

we agree as to this portion of your statement; but, not as to your
continuation:

>… so that the term “root predicate” is insofar uprooted and
>derivative of the originary phenomenon.

the term ‘root predicate’ is not ‘uprooted’ because it is not derivative
of the originary phenomenon. it derives from the language used to say
something about something (whether the orginary phenomenon or something
else).

>ME: This originary phenomenon can have many names,

true enough; but, this originary phenomenon does not tell you its own
name.

the great developmental psychologist Jean Piaget spent a lifetime
investigating the evolution of a world view in children. in _The Child’s
Conception of the World_, Piaget writes about the child’s view of the
relationship between the name and the thing named.

“… in the primitive stage [5-6], the name of the thing is a part of
the thing … it is a part of the essence of a thing.” [p.75]

in the next stage children say that the name is ‘nowhere’ or is ‘in the
air’; but, it is not yet in the mind of the speaker. the name might be
in the voice of the speaker. in the third stage. the child understands
that the name of a thing comes from within us.

“the third stage on the contrary is characterised by this discovery that
names are in ourselves and come from within us. the child asserts
outright that they are ‘in the head’. this stage occurs at the age of 9
or 10.” [p. 77]

phenomenological inquiry needs to assume an adult view of the relation
between names and the things named: no phenomenon, not even the
originary phenomenon, tells us its own name; and, hence, the name we
give it does not derive from it. the name for it comes from the language
we use to name it.

>ME: If you want to proceed “in the same way” as mathematical physics,
>then do so. But I prefer to do philosophical ontology, and you yourself
>claim you are undertaking a phenomenological inquiry. Such an inquiry
>cannot get off the ground if it starts by unquestioningly assuming an
>axiomatic method borrowed from mathematics.

the phenomenological inquiry is certainly one method of conducting a
psychophilosophical inquiry; and, it is the method I use; but, the
results of such an inquiry can not be reported except thru the use of
language (and, I believe, some might say could not be conducted by
someone who had no language).

the axiomatic method borrowed from mathematics is intended to affect the
language used to report the results of phenomenological inquiry; but,
since language use is itself a phenomenon worthy of clarification, the
relation between the axiomatic language and the phenomenological inquiry
is inherently reflexive.

>>>ME: You seem to think that the content is independent of language. It
>>>is not. You have to try to say what you have to say in a particular
>>>language, listening all the while to what that language says to you.
>>>Note also that English ‘being’ has an Indo-European root ‘*bhu’, so
>>>equivalents can be found in all Indo-European languages. But the
>>>important point is that your very thinking is linguistically and
>>>historically situated and bound.

>>this last, claim together with the extensive etymological information
>>you have presented in previous posts, suggests that you have forgotten
>>something significant concerning the relationship between an axiomatic
>>system and its verbal translation (or interpretation or model): it is
>>the axiomatic system that controls the meaning of the verbal
>>translation.

>>you seem to want it the other way around.

>ME: Yes, I do. Axiomatic systems in philosophy (cf. Spinoza’s) are
>invariably based on a misguided emulation of ostensibly rigorous
>mathematical method which unfortunately (for the striving for total
>calculability) runs off the rails in philosophical terrain..

clearly, Spinoza took the axiomatic method to an extreme; but, precisely
where did he go astray?

equally clearly, it is possible to go too far toward the opposite
extreme by completely denying that there can be an axiomatic foundation
for the language in which philosophy is conducted or expressed —
especially since you’ve acknowledged that certain of the axioms that I
have proposed (0, 1, and 2) are actually true.

I prefer to take a middle path: to identify the point at which
psychopilosophers have gone astray by clarifying the relationship
between the meaning of the root predicate as limited by the axiomatic
foundation and the meaning of the root predicate as it is used within an
actual philsophical system.

in your case for example, you seem to insist that ‘being’ must be used
as a root predicate; and, you seem to be saying things about being that
can not be derived from Axiom 0. so the question naturally arises: what
is the basis for such claims? I suspect that your reply would reference
your experience of the originary phenomenon you named ‘being’.

the problematic claim is your insistence that every statement made about
being-[the originary phenomenon] is attributable to whatever is a
being-[the root predicate].

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Saturday, November 24th, 2007 at 1:50 pm
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