The Relationship between Axiom and Translation
November 24th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Yes, I Have No Holerons :: Axiom 0 and its Translation (1) :: Is Dasein a Reality?
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>chaney525 wrote:
>>>The physical causes
>>>of color pertain to the dynamics of energy and to the qualities of
>>>physical matter, but also to the distinct sensory order. The two are
>>>irreducible - the physical order is irreducible to the sensory order.
>>also true. I would conclude from the physical order and the sensory
>>order are different reality types. someone who used ‘being’ as a root
>>predicate might say that they have different modes of being.
>So why wouldn’t the “extra-mental” order and the *mental* order also be
>different reality types, and therefore different modes of being when it
>comes to one’s existence? I mean, just as extra-mental properties and
>the sensation of “red” would be different reality types and modes of
>being, why wouldn’t the same be true of the extra-mental existence of
>the “I” and *thinking* that I exist? That’s what Hume argues (contra
>Descartes).
hello, Anthony; and, thank you for joining the thread.
if I understand your terminology correctly, there *would* be a
difference in reality type between the phenomenological experiencer and
the meta-phenomenal realities that generate the phenomenological
experiencer.
here is my inventory of reality types again, this time the list is
numbered.
1: existential or physical reality (ie existents; or, anything made of
matter/energy and spacetime).
2: phenomenological reality (subject or object of any experience)
3: ontological reality (ie being; or, more generally, anything that has
a reality independent of our experience of it (ie a metaphenomenal
reality); but, which is not an existential reality).
in english first-person self-referencing is done with the first person
singular pronoun; but, there has always been serious ambiguity as to the
reality type of the referent of ‘I’.
consequently, in order to speak precisely, I subscript ‘I’ according to
the reality type asserted of its referent when used.
I suspect that what you mean by ‘mental order’ and by ‘*thinking* that
I exist’ is the I-2, an instance of a phenomenological experiencer or a
instance of phenomenal awareness.
the I-2 might reason as follows:
I-2 know that I-2 am the referent of ‘I-2′ whenever I-2 say
“I-2 am self-aware”. hence, I-2 am in fact self-aware (because
self-asserted self-awareness is self-verifying).
since nothing unreal is self-aware, I-2 know that I-2 am real (in some
sense). I-2 know that I-2 am a reality (of some sort).
however, since I-2 am a phenomenological reality and there is no
evidence that I-2 am self-instantiating, it follows that I-2 am (or may
be) generated by one or more meta-phenomenal realities (ie realities of
type 1 and/or type 2).
the I-2 is now at an impasse that affects all psychophilosophical
inquiry: it is not known whether this I-2 is generated solely by the
brain or some portion thereof (the I-1); or, solely by an immaterial
component of the human individual such as an immaterial mind, soul or
self (the I-3); or, by the interaction of both.
thus, if I have accurately mapped your terms to my reality types
there would be a difference in the reality type attributed to the mental
order and the extra mental order. we just don’t know which reality type
to attribute to the extra mental order.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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