Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> if I understand your terminology correctly, there *would* be a
> difference in reality type between the phenomenological experiencer and
> the meta-phenomenal realities that generate the phenomenological
> experiencer.
>
> here is my inventory of reality types again, this time the list is
> numbered.
>
> 1: existential or physical reality (ie existents; or, anything made of
> matter/energy and spacetime).
>
> 2: phenomenological reality (subject or object of any experience)
>
> 3: ontological reality (ie being; or, more generally, anything that has
> a reality independent of our experience of it (ie a metaphenomenal
> reality); but, which is not an existential reality).

I don’t see why you distinguish 1 from 3. (Descartes doesn’t - for him,
physical reality exists independent of our experience of it)

> in english first-person self-referencing is done with the first person
> singular pronoun; but, there has always been serious ambiguity as to the
> reality type of the referent of ‘I’.
>
> consequently, in order to speak precisely, I subscript ‘I’ according to
> the reality type asserted of its referent when used.
>
> I suspect that what you mean by ‘mental order’ and by ‘*thinking* that
> I exist’ is the I-2, an instance of a phenomenological experiencer or a
> instance of phenomenal awareness.
>
> the I-2 might reason as follows:
>
> I-2 know that I-2 am the referent of ‘I-2′ whenever I-2 say
> “I-2 am self-aware”. hence, I-2 am in fact self-aware (because
> self-asserted self-awareness is self-verifying).
>
> since nothing unreal is self-aware, I-2 know that I-2 am real (in some
> sense). I-2 know that I-2 am a reality (of some sort).

of the I-3 sort?

> however, since I-2 am a phenomenological reality and there is no
> evidence that I-2 am self-instantiating, it follows that I-2 am (or may
> be) generated by one or more meta-phenomenal realities (ie realities of
> type 1 and/or type 2).

I thought type 2 was phenomenal reality. So how can they include
meta-phenomenal realities?

> the I-2 is now at an impasse that affects all psychophilosophical
> inquiry: it is not known whether this I-2 is generated solely by the
> brain or some portion thereof (the I-1); or, solely by an immaterial
> component of the human individual such as an immaterial mind, soul or
> self (the I-3); or, by the interaction of both.
>
> thus, if I have accurately mapped your terms to my reality types
> there would be a difference in the reality type attributed to the mental
> order and the extra mental order. we just don’t know which reality type
> to attribute to the extra mental order.

Posted on Saturday, November 24th, 2007 at 5:00 pm
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