The Relationship between Axiom and Translation
November 24th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Yes, I Have No Holerons :: Axiom 0 and its Translation (1) :: Is Dasein a Reality?
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>if I understand your terminology correctly, there *would* be a
>>difference in reality type between the phenomenological experiencer
>>and the meta-phenomenal realities that generate the phenomenological
>>experiencer.
>>here is my inventory of reality types again, this time the list is
>>numbered.
>>1: existential or physical reality (ie existents; or, anything made of
>>matter/energy and spacetime).
>>2: phenomenological reality (subject or object of any experience)
>>3: ontological reality (ie being; or, more generally, anything that
>>has a reality independent of our experience of it (ie a metaphenomenal
>>reality); but, which is not an existential reality).
>I don’t see why you distinguish 1 from 3. (Descartes doesn’t - for him,
>physical reality exists independent of our experience of it)
my inventory of reality types is not 100% identical to Descartes’
inventory; but, both 1 and 3 are metaphenomenal realities — real
independently of our experience of them.
my reality type 1, existential reality, is more or less identical to
Descartes’ res extensa.
I would allocate Descartes’ res cogitans between reality types 2 and 3.
early in the second mediation, after concluding that no malicious demon,
even one of supreme cunning and power, could falsely convince him that
he was nothing, he begins to ask ‘what am I?’ and concludes (initially)
that he is a mind, a thinking thing.
at this point he is using ‘mind’ or ‘thinking thing’ as I am using
‘experiencer’ or ‘phenomenological experiencer’, I-2. remember, he is
still at this point trying to decide if any of the ideas, images,
feelings or thoughts floating across his awareness correspond to
anything outside his mind — does anything in his awareness correspond
to any metaphenomenal reality.
the are some grounds for saying that Descartes, later in life, did a
similar reallocation.
from the duality of extended stuff and experiencing stuff, he generated
three sets of properties: those he attributed to the body alone; those
he attributed to the mind/soul alone; and, those he attributed to the
union of the mind/soul and its body. Unfortunately, Descartes did not
develop this insight in any systematic way.
Cottingham has an article on “Cartesian trialism” in Mind. 94:218-230
(1985) which I recommend.
>>in english first-person self-referencing is done with the first person
>>singular pronoun; but, there has always been serious ambiguity as to
>>the reality type of the referent of ‘I’.
>>consequently, in order to speak precisely, I subscript ‘I’ according
>>to the reality type asserted of its referent when used.
>>I suspect that what you mean by ‘mental order’ and by ‘*thinking* that
>>I exist’ is the I-2, an instance of a phenomenological experiencer or
>>a instance of phenomenal awareness.
>>the I-2 might reason as follows:
>>I-2 know that I-2 am the referent of ‘I-2′ whenever I-2 say
>>”I-2 am self-aware”. hence, I-2 am in fact self-aware (because
>>self-asserted self-awareness is self-verifying).
>>since nothing unreal is self-aware, I-2 know that I-2 am real (in some
>>sense). I-2 know that I-2 am a reality (of some sort).
>of the I-3 sort?
ooops. that last paragraph should have stopped after
since nothing unreal is self-aware, I-2 know that I-2 am real.
I inadvertantly put in the qualifiers I use when trying to say the same
thing without using subscripted pronouns
>>however, since I-2 am a phenomenological reality and there is no
>>evidence that I-2 am self-instantiating, it follows that I-2 am (or
>>may be) generated by one or more meta-phenomenal realities (ie
>>realities of type 1 and/or type 2).
>I thought type 2 was phenomenal reality. So how can they include
>meta-phenomenal realities?
a typo. that last parenthetical remark should read “(ie realities of
>>type 1 and/or type 3)”.
>>the I-2 is now at an impasse that affects all psychophilosophical
>>inquiry: it is not known whether this I-2 is generated solely by the
>>brain or some portion thereof (the I-1); or, solely by an immaterial
>>component of the human individual such as an immaterial mind, soul or
>>self (the I-3); or, by the interaction of both.
>>thus, if I have accurately mapped your terms to my reality types
>>there would be a difference in the reality type attributed to the
>>mental order and the extra mental order. we just don’t know which
>>reality type to attribute to the extra mental order.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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