Heidegger

In a message dated 9/7/2009 10:51:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
allen.scult at drake.edu writes:

We were hassling a while back over whether the thinking in the Cogito
referred only to the thinker for whom thinking and existence were an
issue. I want to add to the unlikelihood of the idea by quoting
Gadamer on Kant: ” Thus the quality of being-in-itself that
distinguishes the thing-in-itself from its appearance is in-itself
only for us” (T and M, 338)The “us” here I would argue is not all of
us, but only those of us for whom the Ding-an-Sich(sic) is a serious
issue of thinking. For the rest us, the assertion is meaningless

Hi Allen:
Be it reminded that the notion of the ding an sich and Kant”s noumenon are
throwbacks to the Greek philosophical tradition of never asessing a
phenomenon right on and making a judgement accordingly. Philsophical explication
came only through the eidos and its grasp of the eide that were already
conceptual quantums that were neither phenomenal or existential. The eide were thus
the currency of authentic thinking and what today, qua Kant, we nominalize
as the thing in itself and which is hardly a thing (of perception) but “in
itself” as eide. Need it be added that “thinking” in its philosophical mode
is impossible without such parsing of phenomenon in favor of an abstract
conceptual unit (as eide or ding an sich) that as such are the materia of the
eidos. I dare say that from hands on Alchemy to scientific empiricism the
Greek method of thinking qua the eidos is totally irrelevant.
Bernard X Bovasso

Posted on Sunday, September 13th, 2009 at 6:00 am
rss 2.0 | trackback