Heidegger

moi earlier:

>> The exquisite difficulty faced in Heidegger’s thinkerly walk is that he
>> seeks a thinking path that is not representational, that is not an act of
>> will; and the initial ‘problem’ is how to not even will the not-willing (how
>> to not represent the non-representational). Long’s walking helps us because
>> he accompanies his non-representational artworks with representational
>> souvenirs (comings with/before, underlying/accomanying). For the thinker
>> this might mean that the post-metaphysical thinking that Heidegger seeks in
>> the Conversation can be accomapanied by metaphysical (representational,
>> calculative) souvenirs; that the restitution of thinking when thinking is
>> brought into the region of the non-representational can be realised without
>> the total abandonment of the calculative (will). Although the Conversation
>> begins far from human habitation, it is nontheless walked/talked by human
>> walkers/talkers. For both Long and Heidegger the ‘aim’ with each footfall of
>> their paths is to listen sensitively to that which calls for each footfall,
>> the eros of walking and stalking and talking. The Conversation is enacted as
>> a conversation in the soul (Plato’s path in the Socratic dialogues) and thus
>> is just as solitary as Long’s long walks and traipses into the deserted (by
>> productive/calculative/mobilised civilisation).

responds BernX:

> Hi MichaelP;
> Good to keep in mind that the “non-representational” is better addressed as
> the irrepresentational or more to the Aristotelian point, and long before
> Heidegger, the empty pleroma of pre-disposition to form otherwise known as
> potentia. Potential is necessarilly empty except as the field of
> pre-formal (proto-Morphe) predispositions. How can something that is
> nothing generate something? Go ask Anaximander with what he called apieron
> (the boundless), the something that is nothing that Aristotle called empty
> and formless potentia. What Heridegger calls it, I have not the slightest
> idea except for his walk circulus in probando. I realize, of course, how
> difficult it is for thinking to free itself from its tautological rose
> garden except to first generate *enantia*.

Hi Bernard, I don’t see why the non-representational is simply nothing at
all, rather just what is not representable; the example I’ve given in
contemporary art are the walks of Richard Long; the art works are not the
photographic souvenirs displayed in museums and galleries (visual
representations); they (the photos) are rather the parergonal, the
alongsides of the work. Of course, something non-representational can be
represented but then that representation is not of the non-representational
but merely that of the non-representational that can be represented in some
form: i.e., a misrepresentation, misrepresenting because it has represented
something else but without saying so… Also, given my possibly erroneous
notion of potential, what I mean by the non-representational is definitely
not what is potential (nor actual, because not potential); it is neither
potential nor actual but nonetheless it is. What the camera cannot catch in
its own manner of catching (imaging) is not nothing, meaning simply that the
camera’s catches miss what is not image-able, not catchable in that way. You
might think this: instead of thinking of what we can grasp (sub-ject as
object, whether with camera or other apparatuses or with concepts) we might
think of what we are in the grasp of (in thinking (of what we can grasp)).

ps: Bernard, pray, what is a “pleroma” empty or otherwise? And by “enantia”
do you refer to a species of flutterby?

regards

michaelP

Posted on Sunday, June 28th, 2009 at 6:00 am
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