- True for All Reality Types?
April 27th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Self-Identity for All Reality Types? :: Self-Identity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?
Self-Identity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>>>>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>>>>>>>>throughout all my perceptions.
>>>>>I have addressed your premise 3. I have expressed my skepticism of
>>>>>it. let me summarize and extend my critique of this premise.
>>>>>1: it is *your* premise; and, therefore, *you* need to support it.
>>>>>you have not told us anything about your attempts (if any) to look
>>>>>for evidence. what was your evidence detection criteria? did you do
>>>>>a complete census of a certain domain or did you just search a
>>>>>representative sample of that domain?
>>>>Not just me, Joe. Hume tried too. So have a multitude of
>>>>philosophers since Descartes.
okay; so, your position is popular; but, popularity is not evidence of
truth.
>>>>Apparently Joseph Polanik is the first in modern times to have
>>>>found positive evidence for whatever entity it is that supposedly
>>>>remains identical throughout all human perception. Care to enlighten
>>>>us, as well as western history?
>>>no; that’s not my job. it’s up to you to justify your negative
>>>conclusion. I’m merely expressing my skepticism of your argument.
>>>you are in the position of the european zoologist who reported the
>>>results of a survey of the swan population 300 years ago. “I found no
>>>evidence of black swans. therefore (by means of evidence-based
>>>logical deduction), I conclude that there are no black swans.”
>nice try, but you missed the vital difference: it remained a logical
>possibility 300 years ago that humans could encounter black swans. But
>there is no logical possibility that humans can encounter what is
>non-phenomenal (like your reality types 1 and 3), since whatever is
>encountered is by definition a phenomenon to us. Any evidence for your
>reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically impossible.
>Of course we all know that you didn’t really “miss” this argument,
>since it’s simply Hume’s argument against concluding to anything
>non-phenomenal from the phenomenal
not so fast, Anthony.
we were discussing phenomenological realities only; including, but not
limited to, the phenomenological reality of reflective self-awareness.
when I asked you to specify which reality type your argument applied to
(ie what was the reality type of the I that could draw a skeptical
conclusion as to its own existence), you replied that your argument
applied to any reality type [2008-03-29]
I replied [2008-04-02]:
>that’s a pretty strong statement. you are claiming that your argument
>remains true when applied to an I of any reality type. in a sense,
>you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a variable which ranges over a
>certain set of proposed reality types. you say the argument “covers all
>three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are not phenomenal,
>while I-2 is phenomenal”.
>so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
>merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
>chosen reality type.
>ok. I choose the I-3.
>to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
>prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
>that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
>is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
>[NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
>I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
>or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
you’ve never even *attempted* to explain how you know your argument
applied to meta-phenomenal (a.k.a. non-phenomenal) reality types.
if you now want to discuss meta-phenomenal reality types; start there.
explain how you know your argument applies to meta-phenomenal reality
types before you established either that there are or that there are no
entities of any meta-phenomenal reality type.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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