Unacknowleged Consequences
June 29th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Unacknowleged Consequences :: Unacknowleged Consequences :: Germans outplayed by Ahmadinejad in their own Spiegel/Mirror :: Broken Tools
MichaelE:
> >ME. Not everybody tries to assert that nothing can be predicated of
> >nothingness, and I have shown how you contradict yourself in the
> >attempt to do so.
JoeP:
> you have shown (to your own satisfaction, of course) that *any* effort
> (not just my effort) to formally disallow the predication of
> nothing(ness) is self-contradictory; but, you refuse to admit that you
> have thereby proven that it is possible to attribute predicates to
> nothing(ness).
>
> that’s the HNA.
That’s the rub… I may have gotten it wrong but it seems to me that
contra-diction embraces both the possibility of predicating and not
predicating nothingness or be-ing; of course, one *can* *concretely* (it is
“allowable” to) attribute predicates to nothingness or be-ing (e.g.,
nothingness is blue and shaped like Zappa’s guitar solo in Willie The Pimp),
but analytically it might amount to silence and thus be analytically
im-possible. The problem here, for me, is that of whether it is appropriate
to deal predicationally with that which is not a thing (no-thing), not a
being (non-being); this problem is essentially the same as that of whether
the technicised (mathematical) logical apparatuses that you employ without
question (sets, taxonomies, Ps&Qs, etc) are not questionable in the face of
nothingness/be-ing, i.e., whether logic (in that sense) is not secondary,
derived, i.e., that it is subject to something else and not that which can
sub-ject absolutely anything); whether the very basis of predication
(’isness’ if you like) is not itself, is not itself the very unpredicational
since it is what all predication ‘assumes’ in order for predication to take
place at all… I am not going to say categorically that one cannot (should
not) concretely predicate nothingness/be-ing: my point is that it makes no
sense (nonsense) to even try (because neither nothingness nor be-ing is {a
being}). Or, is there no limit to the power of mathematical logics? I think
such a question in some way was inadvertently raised by a mathematician,
Gödel, no?
Joe, you have not yet even begun to try to answer my perennial question here
(concerning the appropriateness of the apparatuses employed, etc): you seem
to assume absolute power to your mathematical logics and apparatuses no
matter what the matter of interest (what you sub-ject, the matter of
discourse). What does that say philosophically? Ignoring all the essential
questions (regarding your own apparent questions {”what am I?”}) is the very
opposite of philosophising.
regards
michaelP
