What is an Ontology?
March 24th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Somewhat Vexing– Ontology qua Thanatos :: further lunacy stirs + :: What is an Ontology? :: Somewhat Vexing– Ontology qua Thanatos
Michael Eldred wrote:
>Joseph Polanik schrieb Sat, 22 Mar 2008 08:48:55 -0500:
>>Michael Eldred wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik schrieb
>>>>That Pete wrote:
>>>>>Well, in “who am I”, I understand that the “am” is the domain of
>>>>>ontology, and if the answer is that “I” is “a mammal”, or “Wu Ming,
>>>>>General Citizen, SS# 123-45-6789″, then the answer is about where
>>>>>the “I” fits in a taxonomy or database, is knowledge and thus
>>>>>epistemological.
>>>>>I’m curious about claims that who-ness is properly an issue of
>>>>>ontology. People are encountered in an openness, and the “who that
>>>>>I am” may be reflective happening in that open. But is that, in and
>>>>>of itself, sufficient to make whoness an ontological issue?
>>>ME: Whoness as a shining-back (Widerschein) from the world.
>>>”Heidegger is at pains to comprehend “this enigmatic shining-back of
>>>the self out of things philosophically” (diesen rätselhaften
>>>Widerschein des Selbst aus den Dingen her philosophisch, GA24:229) “
>>> http://www.webcom.com/artefact/dlctcslf….. )
>>a genuine encounter with another may be well described as a shining
>>thru and a shining back; but, is that ontology … or dating?
>>>>JP: who is claiming that who-ness is properly an issue of ontology?
>>>>look at the sample answers to ‘who am I?’ that you gave. the first
>>>>(’mammal’) is also a potential answer to ‘what am I?’ the second
>>>>(’Wu Ming, General Citizen, SS# 123-45-6789′) is not.
>>>ME: Rather the opposite. Whatness is the traditional cover-up for the
>>>genuine phenomenon of whoness which the personal pronoun “I” is
>>>already on the way to skipping over. Anyone claiming that “ontology
>>>concerns what there is; so, ‘what am I?’ is an ontological question;”
>>>(Wed, 19 Mar 2008 04:49:25 -0500) has no philosophical question at
>>>all,
>>JP: ontology is defined as the study of what there is; for example, in
>>this
>>definition from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
>>”As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is.”
>ME: Rather, one would have to say, “As a last degeneration, ontology is
>the study of what there is.”
>>JP: the article continues:
>>”Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology, like
>>the question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the
>>existence of universals. These are all problems in ontology in the
>>sense that they deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more
>>broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to
>>encompass problems about the most general features and relations of
>>the entities which do exist. There are also a number of classic
>>philosophical problems that are problems in ontology understood this
>>way. For example the problem how a universal relates to a particular
>>that has it (assuming there are universals and particulars), or the
>>problem how an event like John eating a cookie relate to the
>>particulars John and the cookie, and the relation of eating, assuming
>>there are events, particulars and relations. These kinds of problems
>>quickly turn into metaphysics more generally, which is the
>>philosophical discipline that encompasses ontology as one of its
>>parts. The borders here are a little fussy. But we have at least two
>>parts to the overall philosophical project of ontology: first, say
>>what there is, what exists, what the stuff is reality is made out off,
>>secondly, say what the most general features and relations of these
>>things are.”
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-…]
>ME: These guys at Stanford should limit themselves to eating cookies.
it’s not just those guys at Stanford. here’s a definition from the
online Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names:
Ontology - Branch of metaphysics concerned with identifying, in the most
general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist. Thus, the
“ontological commitments” of a philosophical position include both its
explicit assertions and its implicit presuppositions about the existence
of entities, substances, or beings of particular kinds.
[Philosophy Dictionary at http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/o.htm#…]
do you have any references to any philosopher other than Heidegger who
attempted to make ontology a question of who there is instead of what
there is?
>The term ‘ontology’ goes back to R. Goeckel (Goclenius) around 1600
>who, in his ‘Lexicon philosophicum’, introduces _epistaemae
>ontologikae_ as term for one of the three Aristotelean _epistaemai
>theooretikai_. Ontology thus names Aristotle’s prima philosophia as the
>inquiry into _to on haei on_ which phrase can be variously rendered in
>English as “beings insofar as they are beings” or ” “beings as such” or
>”beings qua beings” or “beings as beings” or “beings in their being”.
>Unfortunately, today we have become too dumb to understand the import
>of such a well-thought-out formulation which is, in any case, the most
>open definition of ontology.
so, what is it about “the most open definition of ontology” that limits
an ontology to those beings that have a who-ness about them?
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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