Heidegger

In a message dated 17/02/2008 15:14:38 GMT Standard Time, jPolanik at nc.rr.com
writes:

Yes, I Have No Holeron

gevans613 at aol.com wrote:

>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:

>>the root predicate is the word designated to carry the meaning ‘not
>>nothing’ and is attributable to all that is. the root predicate is
>>non-informative in that it adds no information to the meaning already
>>known ‘not nothing’ (so, in Kantian jargon, the root predicate is a
>>merely logical predicate).

>The term *not nothing* is a risible Platonic attempt at an
>instantiation of a non-existent holeron or putative *other.*

you have me confused with someone else.
Jud:
With whom? Plato? Dr. Falacia? You wrote that the root predicate is the
word designated to carry the meaning ‘not nothing.*
If the root predicate is predicationally appropriate for all subjects, does
that mean that the term *root predicate* and the term *not nothing* are
interchangable* if one term carries the same semantic meaning as the other. That
means that the predicate *not nothing* can stand as the predicate of
everything in the cosmos.

So in the sentence: *There is nothing in the fridge,* it really means
there is *not nothing* in the fridge - in other words there is something in the
fridge.
(i.e., *not nothing* which is not *not nothing* but something.)

perhaps, you should consider reviewing the opening paragraph of your web
page contrasting Plato and Parmenides:

“Why did Parmenides, the greatest Pre-Socratic philosopher of all time,
understand the simplicity of the concept of *being* as *The One* (to on
- that which is) whilst later Plato preferred to struggle on in the
metaphysical mire of believing that *nothing* (to mae on - that which is
not ) actually exists?”

 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

I am not saying that the word ‘nothing’ has a referent which in some
sense is. I am saying that for any x that is, x is not nothing. in
symbolic form:

-[(Ex)(Nx)] (x)(-Nx)

the left side of the above equation may be translated thus: it is not
the case that there is an x such that x is nothing. it represents the
*denial* of Plato’s claim that nothing actually exists.

this denial of Plato’s claim is logically equivalent to *my claim* on
the right side of the equation which may be translated thus: for any x
that is, x is not nothing.
Jud:
If that be the case then your original statement should be re-jigged to say:

*The root predicate is attributable to all that is. The term designated to
carry the meaning of the root predicate is ‘not
nothing’ on the understanding that it is not the case that there is an
existent such that the existent is nothing.*

So where does this leave Heidegger’s *Being? * If as Heidegger claims
*Being* does not exist, then *Being* does not qualify as a predicate and nothing
can be predicated of it. *Being,* both being and the same time not-being
both *nothing* and *not- nothing* can be construed as syncategorematically
significant in context, but naming nothing ( or for certain trannies:
*not-nothing*) cannot stand as the subject or (especially) the predicate of a
proposition. Therefore *Being* as a non-existent (as Parmenides pointed out)
cannot be meaninglfully spoken of without flecks of phlogistonic foam appearing at
the corners of the mouth? Yes?
Regards,

Jud

Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

Posted on Sunday, February 17th, 2008 at 5:00 pm
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